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THE UNWILLING DONOR
Jennifer Mueller*
Abstract: For nearly forty years, the Supreme Court has evaluated campaign finance
restrictions by weighing the First Amendment burden they place on a donor eager to engage
the political process against the government’s interest in avoiding corruption of that process.
Most recently, in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Court struck down aggregate contribution limits,
allowing donors to give—and candidates and parties to solicit—millions of dollars directly to
candidates, parties, and political action committees. Yet what should have been a significant
victory for big donors was greeted with dismay by many of the same.
There is growing evidence that the story we have been telling ourselves about political
money is, at best, incomplete, and that many donors give only reluctantly, out of fear of
political repercussions. This Article examines the problem of the unwilling donor and argues
for the first time that it has significant implications for campaign finance doctrine. Flipping
the narrative allows a fresh view of key concepts, including the need for systemic campaign
finance regulations, the Court’s current emphasis on quid pro quo corruption, and the First
Amendment interests of campaign donors. Previous scholarship has overlooked the existence
and constitutional import of this alternative, “extortionate,” framework.
The Unwilling Donor steps into this critical gap. The Article first provides an overview of
the Supreme Court’s past campaign finance jurisprudence, including McCutcheon, almost all
of which is premised on the notion of a willing donor. It then surveys empirical studies and
historical data to demonstrate that the unwilling donor, while perhaps not a sympathetic
character, is a very real one. The final Part of the Article contemplates the legal significance
of the unwilling donor problem, concluding that it is relevant to the continued vitality of
campaign finance efforts, to the Court’s analysis of campaign finance reform restrictions, and
to future litigation strategies in this area.
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INTRODUCTION
“The sweetest words in the English language are: ‘I’m maxed
out.’”1
Big political donors—so-called “fat cats,”2 “deep pockets,”3 or
“whales”4—hardly cut sympathetic figures. Even before Citizens United
v. FEC5 changed the rules for corporate and union political spending,
rich donors had free rein to spend as much money as they wished to
influence federal elections so long as their expenditures were neither
requested by nor coordinated with an elected official, political party
member, or candidate.6 Some have seized that opportunity, particularly
in recent years.7
1. Observation made to author in 2002 by a former colleague and big donor.
2. Fat Cat, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 828 (2002).
3. Peter Olsen-Phillips & Kathy Kiely, Keystone XL: Senate Caught Between Big Donors,
SUNLIGHT
FOUND.
BLOG
(Nov.
18,
2014,
11:04
AM),
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/11/18/keystone-xl-senate-caught-between-big-donors/.
4. Joel Connelly, ‘Big Money’: How American Politics Became a Game Run by and for
Billionaires,
SEATTLEPI: STRANGE
BEDFELLOWS
(June
9,
2014,
3:37
PM),
http://blog.seattlepi.com/seattlepolitics/2014/06/09/big-money-how-american-politics-became-agame-run-by-and-for-billionaires/.
5. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
6. Id. Individuals have always been free to spend independently to support candidates through
outside spending not coordinated with a candidate or campaign. Id. at 355. Citizens United removed
limits on corporation and union independent expenditures and electioneering communications. Id. at
340–65.
7. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, Koch Brothers’ Budget of $889 Million for 2016 Is on Par with
Both Parties’ Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
01/27/us/politics/kochs-plan-to-spend-900-million-on-2016-campaign.html?_r=1; Peter OlsenPhillips, Revenge of the Democrats: Wealthy Liberals Top List of Super PAC Donors in 2014,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2014, 2:46 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog
/2014/10/24/revenge-of-the-democrats/; 2012 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups,
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Individual donors are far more restricted if they want to make “hard
money” contributions, however. “Hard” dollars are the only funds that a
federal candidate can legally solicit and the only funds that can flow
directly into campaign committees, political parties, and traditional
political action committees (PACs).8 Until April 2014, a large donor
who wished to give directly to his favorite candidate or political party
was constrained by two limits.9 The first was a “base limit” that capped
the amount that an individual could give to any individual candidate,
national party committee, state party committee, or PAC.10 For example,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=
D&type=V&superonly=N (last visited July 19, 2015) (noting that the top 100 individual donors,
who donated two-thirds of the total amount given to SuperPACS, donated amounts from $885,000
to $92.7 million).
8. 52 U.S.C. § 30125(e)(1) (2012). An individual’s contributions to PACs are limited to $5000
per PAC per year. Id. § 30116(a)(1)(C). “SuperPACs,” technically known as independent
expenditure committees, are not subject to these limits but can make neither direct contributions nor
any expenditure that is solicited by or coordinated with a candidate, party, or campaign. Id. § 30101
(17); 11 C.F.R. § 100.16 (2014). Solicitations for and contributions of unrestricted “soft money,”
which historically supported party activities other than direct campaigning, have been banned since
the 2002 passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). 52 U.S.C. § 30125(a).
Corporations and unions cannot make direct, “hard money,” contributions, although they may form
PACs to which their employees or members can contribute. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
116–17 (2003) (tracing the history of these bans).
9. The Biennial Contribution Limit, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/
pages/brochures/biennial.shtml (last visited July 19, 2015). Throughout this Article, I will refer to
the donor as a male. This reflects the reality that less than a third of political donors are women. See
Donor
Demographics,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/
donordemographics.php?cycle=2014&filter=G (last visited July 19, 2015) (analyzing the gender
disparity of donors for the 2013–2014 campaign cycle). Of the top 100 political donors in 2012,
only eleven were women, down from twenty-one in 1990. See id.; Sarah Bryner & Doug Weber,
Sex, Money & Politics: A Center for Responsive Politics Report on Women as Donors and
Candidates,
OPENSECRETS.ORG
(Sept.
26,
2013),
http://www.opensecrets.org/
news/reports/gender.php (noting that the percentage of women donors increased only three percent
over nearly a quarter century); Anna Palmer & Tarini Parti, Money Gap: Why Don’t Women Give?,
POLITICO (July 22, 2014, 5:02 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/women-politicaldonations-109206.html (reporting that the top ten male donors had given over six times more than
the top ten female donors at that point in the election cycle). Because I value not only verisimilitude,
but also aspiration and narrative clarity, I will generally refer to elected officials or candidates as
female.
10. In 2013–2014, the maximum “base level” donation for an individual was $2600 to a candidate
per election (or $5200 assuming a primary and general election), $32,400 to a national party
committee per year, $10,000 to a state party committee per year, and $5000 to a PAC per year.
Contribution
Limits
2013–14,
FED.
ELECTION
COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/
pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). Many of these limits are indexed
for inflation. For the 2015–2016 election cycle, the indexed limits increased to $2700 to a candidate
per election and $33,400 to a national party committee per year. Price Index Adjustments for
Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobby Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 80 Fed. Reg.
5750 (Feb. 3, 2015). A donation directed or earmarked for a candidate through another committee is
treated as a direct donation to the candidate. 11 C.F.R. § 110.6. Additionally, in its 2015
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in the 2013–2014 election cycle, a donor could write a check (or a series
of checks) to then-House Speaker John Boehner for no more than a total
of $5200, and to the Republican National Committee for no more than a
total of $64,800.11 The second limit was the “aggregate limit,” which
capped the total amount a donor could directly contribute to all
recipients per two-year cycle.12 For 2013–2014, a donor “maxed out”
once he gave an aggregate of $48,600 to candidates and $74,600 to
parties and other political committees, for a grand total of $123,200.13 In
early 2014, a donor from Georgia, a state that holds fourteen seats in the
House of Representatives, would have faced a choice if he wished to
contribute to his state’s Democratic slate of congressional candidates:
pick nine candidates to support with the maximum $5200 contribution,
or give just $3471 to each of the fourteen candidates.
That changed in April 2014, when the Supreme Court struck down the
aggregate limits in McCutcheon v. FEC.14 Individual donors can now
contribute up to the base limit to every candidate, national and state
committee, and PAC. The day after McCutcheon, if our hypothetical
donor wished to “max out” to each candidate and party committee, he
could have directly contributed more than $3.6 million per election cycle
per party—a figure that excludes contributions to PACs, which number
in the thousands.15 According to a plurality of Justices on the Supreme
appropriations act, Congress allowed national, senatorial, and congressional party committees to
create separate committee accounts and set dramatically higher contribution limits for these
committees. See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113235, div. N, § 101, 128 Stat. 2130, 2772–73 (2014) (to be codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30116). In the
2015–2016 cycle, national, senatorial, and congressional party committees can solicit up to
$100,200 for each of three new accounts—conventions, election recounts and legal proceedings,
and national party headquarters buildings—in addition to their main account. Id.; see also FEC,
CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR 2015–2016 FEDERAL ELECTIONS, n.2, available at
http://www.fec.gov/info/contriblimitschart1516.pdf. Only the national party committees can create
accounts for presidential conventions. div. N, § 101, 128 Stat. at 2772–73. In total, a donor in the
2015–2016 cycle can now contribute (and be asked to contribute) up to $334,000 to a national party
and $233,800 to each of a party’s senate and congressional campaign committees, or $801,000 per
party; some have shown a willingness to do so. See, e.g., Rebecca Ballhaus, Billionaire Ken Griffin
Is First to Max-Out on New Party Donation Limits, WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Feb. 23, 2015, 2:15
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/02/23/billionaire-ken-griffin-is-first-to-max-out-on-newparty-donation-limits/ (highlighting how just two months after Congress passed the appropriations
bill, an individual donor maxed out at the new, inflated levels).
11. See Contribution Limits 2013–14, supra note 10.
12. 52 U.S.C. § 30116.
13. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (plurality opinion).
14. Id.
15. The $3.6 million figure represented what was, at the time McCutcheon was decided, the
maximum that an individual donor could give if he were to support to the maximum allowable
amount a candidate in every House and Senate race, three national party committees, and fifty state
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Court, abolishing aggregate limits advances wealthy donors’ First
Amendment rights, allowing them to fully “participat[e] in an electoral
debate that we have recognized is ‘integral to the operation of the system
of government established by our Constitution.’”16 This line of reasoning
follows a narrative that has informed every campaign finance case since
Buckley v. Valeo17 in 1976, a narrative in which wealthy special interests
clamor to influence the political process. The task then for courts is to
weigh these donors’ First Amendment interests in speech and
association against the risk that their participation might corrupt, or
appear to corrupt, candidates and elected officials.18
This Article argues that this narrative is, at best, incomplete, and that
this deficiency has significant and underappreciated doctrinal
consequences. Evidence of this oversight comes in part from donors
themselves. Although on its face the McCutcheon ruling marked a great
victory for the aforementioned “fat cats,” it was greeted with dismay by
many in the business and lobbying communities—the very wealthy
donors whose rights a plurality of the Court vigorously defended. “I’m
parties. See id. at 1473 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (highlighting how a hypothetical “Rich Donor” could
funnel the entire $3.6 million to one candidate via PACs). In December 2014, Congress increased
both the number of national party accounts and also raised the cap for contributions to those
accounts to $100,200 per account annually. See div. N, § 101, 128 Stat. at 2772–73. Thus, for the
2015–2016 election cycle the maximum allowable individual contribution—making the same
assumptions—would rise from $3.6 million to $5.1 million. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1485
app. B (describing how Justice Breyer came to the original $3.6 million figure); Price Index
Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobby Bundling Disclosure
Threshold, 80 Fed. Reg. 5750. While this figure assumes maximum giving, it also assumes that the
contributor would support only one candidate in each primary and one party’s committees; the
Court most likely envisioned a straight-party ticket. See Justin Levitt, Why McCutcheon Is Bad
News
for
Millionaires,
POLITICO
(Apr.
2,
2014),
http://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2014/04/mccutcheon-supreme-court-millionaires-105307.html#.VCB_5OcdKC8.
As Donald Trump colorfully reminded voters during his run for the Republican presidential
nomination in 2015, however, some donors will give significant amounts to both parties. See Will
Cabaniss, Donald Trump’s Campaign Contributions to Democrats and Republicans, PUNDITFACT
(July 9, 2015, 6:29 PM), http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2015/jul/09/benferguson/donald-trumps-campaign-contributions-democrats-and/. PACs, which are not considered
in the $3.6 (now $5.1) million calculation, currently number over 7300, including 532 “Leadership
PACs” affiliated with federal candidates but independent of their campaigns. See Press Release,
FEC, FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of the 2011–2012 Election Cycle (2014),
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/pdf/20130419release.pdf.
16. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)).
17. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
18. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444, 1448; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361
(2010); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 478 (2007); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146,
155 (2003); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 387–88 (2000); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 661 (1990);
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
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horrified, planning to de-list my phone number and destroy my email
address,” said one donor who had previously given at the aggregate
limits.19 “I’m poor again as a result,” announced a top lobbyist who had
also maxed out in previous election cycles.20 “We believe that the
decision is based on wishful thinking,” wrote the American Sustainable
Business Council on behalf of its more than 200,000 members.21
From the reactions, it seems that McCutcheon may have been the least
business-friendly Supreme Court decision of the term.22 It also may have
been one of the most troubling First Amendment decisions, although not
for the reasons—or not only for the reasons—that commentators have
already noted. The opinion has been critiqued for narrowing the grounds
on which Congress can enact campaign finance contribution restrictions
to the risk of actual or apparent “quid pro quo” corruption.23 Relatedly,
some have suggested that because quid pro quo transactions between
contributors and candidates are already prohibited by a web of federal
and state criminal laws, the Court’s holding presages a not-so-distant
day when the entirety of the federal campaign finance framework will be
19. Anna Palmer & Tarini Parti, Big Donors Fear Shakedown, POLITICO (Apr. 2, 2014, 7:36 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/supreme-court-campaign-finance-donations-mccutcheon105320.html#ixzz3Bz0TAkeq.
20. Id.
21. Business Leaders Critical of McCutcheon v. FEC Campaign Finance Decision, AM.
SUSTAINABLE BUS. COUNCIL (Apr. 3, 2014), http://asbcouncil.org/news/press-release/businessleaders-critical-mccutcheon-v-fec-campaign-finance-decision#.U8W2aPldWSp [hereinafter ASB
Business Leaders Critical]; see also Tory Newmyer, Are Lobbyists the Biggest Losers PostMcCutcheon?, FORTUNE (Apr. 2, 2014, 6:36 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/04/02/are-lobbyists-thebiggest-losers-post-mccutcheon/ (describing lobbyists as anxious about having to hand over more
money to political campaigns).
22. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947
(2008) (describing the Supreme Court, as of 2008, as generally favoring business over interests of
others, such as consumers and employers, to an extent not seen since the 1930s); Lee Epstein,
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1431 (2013) (determining, based on Supreme Court opinions since 1946, that five of the ten
Justices most favorable to business are currently on the Supreme Court).
23. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., An Indecent Burial, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/opinion/an-indecent-burial.html; Richard A. Posner, Does
Chief Justice John Roberts Show a Certain Casualness About the Truth?, SLATE (June 25, 2014,
1:06 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2014/
scotus_roundup/scotus_end_of_term_is_roberts_casual_about_the_truth_in_the_campaign_finance.
html; Zephyr Teachout, What John Roberts Doesn’t Get About Corruption, POLITICO (Apr. 14,
2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/04/what-john-roberts-doesnt-get-aboutcorruption-105683.html#.VBjOH_ldV8E. In theory, the “circumvention rationale”—which allows
Congress to enact supplemental limitations designed to prevent an end-run around core campaign
finance restrictions—still survives, but after McCutcheon it is not clear what circumventionprevention provisions would pass constitutional muster. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1454–56; id.
at 1473–77 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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found redundant and not sufficiently compelling to justify the First
Amendment burden it places on campaign contributors.24
Ignored in these discussions are the First Amendment interests of the
donor who does not want to give, or does not want to give at the
requested levels, but feels he has no choice. This is not the donor who
gives willingly but with a possibly mixed motive (i.e., support and
access), but one who would choose not to become involved in political
discussions at all, or to the amount asked, yet believes a candidate’s
potential to harm his business or financial interests is such that he cannot
risk turning down a direct request for support. I call him the unwilling
donor.25 There is abundant evidence such donors exist, and they are
becoming more vocal. A former president of Shell Oil USA recently
called his prior campaign contributions extortion payments on national
television.26 In the fall of 2013, the book Extortion compared elected
officials to mafia dons.27
Notwithstanding these increasingly assertive (and possibly
overwrought) reports in the press, the problem of the unwilling donor
has gone largely unremarked by election law and First Amendment
scholars. This is particularly curious given the development of related
concepts in public choice scholarship.28 For decades, social scientists
promoted “rent-seeking” as an economic theory of political exchange
that explains socially inefficient public laws and regulations by reference
to private gains favoring the rent seeker, or briber—a model that closely
tracks the classic campaign finance narrative described above.29
24. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Die Another Day: The Supreme Court Takes a Big Step Closer to
Gutting the Last Bits of Campaign Finance Reform, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2014, 1:13 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/04/the_subtle_awfulness_of_t
he_mccutcheon_v_fec_campaign_finance_decision_the.html (arguing the Chief Justice’s opinion
opens the door to attack for what remains of campaign finance law).
25. I have chosen “unwilling” because it offers the cleanest parallel to “willing,” although its
meaning is also captured by other adjectives such as “reluctant” or “grudging”; the reader may find
one of these alternatives more appealing (or appropriately nuanced), but it does not change the
analysis.
26. David Fitzpatrick & Drew Griffin, Ex-Shell Oil President: ‘I Felt Extorted,’ CNN (Jan. 23,
2014, 8:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/political-fundraising-griffin/ (quoting
John Hofmeister as saying: “Every time I wrote a check I felt that it was a form of extortion, the
price of entry, because of the reception that you got when you contributed versus the reception when
you did not contribute”).
27. PETER SCHWEIZER, EXTORTION 19–20, 39–40, 101–02 (2013).
28. See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335
(1974) (outlining public choice theory); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
29. See Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 291 (1974) (coining the term “rent-seeking” as an explanation of the behaviors of actors in
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Following on this work, in 1997 economist and law professor Fred
McChesney demonstrated that political giving that could not be
rationalized through a “rent seeking” cost-benefit analysis could be
explained by looking instead to “rent extraction,” or private gain by the
public official (the rent extractor, or extorter).30 However, few scholars
have examined whether a similar shift of viewpoint might offer new
insights in the campaign finance context.31
This Article ventures into this surprisingly under-theorized area to
argue that the problem of the unwilling donor is a foundational one for
campaign finance doctrine, one that goes far deeper than notions of
corruption, quid pro quo or otherwise. An individual’s interest in freely
choosing not to speak or to associate is surely no less important than his
right to engage in these activities free of undue government interference,
and both are equally magnified when that speech cuts to the heart of the
political dialogue that is meant to undergird our democracy. Likewise,
the government has an interest in protecting the rights of both the willing
and unwilling donor that extends beyond concerns about corruption or

markets with government regulations who compete for “rents,” or profits to be made as a result of
government allocation). As used in public choice literature, “rent seeking” is a form of socially
inefficient profit seeking through which one seeks advantage through political allocation rather than
the markets; money received in excess of opportunity costs are called “rents.” See James M.
Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in 40 YEARS OF RESEARCH ON RENT SEEKING 1:
THEORY OF RENT SEEKING 55, 55–60 (Roger D. Congleton et al. eds., 2008).
30. See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING 2–3 (1997) (explaining the system of
payments made to politicians not as payments for favors or “rent seeking,” but rather as a system of
political extortion to avoid disfavor and terming it “rent extraction” or “wealth extraction”); see also
Douglas Ginsburg, A New Economic Theory of Regulation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1771 (1999) (placing
McChesney in George Stigler’s “economic theory of regulation school”). McChesney further argues
that the only way to solve the problem of rent extraction is to reduce the size of the federal
government, thereby limiting the coercive potential of “asks.” MCCHESNEY, supra, at 170. For
reasons beyond the scope of this Article, I find this conclusion problematic, and I am not persuaded
that it would address the problem of the unwilling donor.
31. The most notable works of legal scholarship in this area are Robert H. Sitkoff’s 2002 Article
Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1103 (2002), and Richard L. Hasen’s 2012 Article Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the
Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2012). Similarly, Heather K. Gerken and Alex Tausanovitch
recently observed that lobbying—which is implicated in any discussion of rent-seeking or rentextracting—is the “red-headed stepchild” in election law. Heather K. Gerken & Alex Tausanovitch,
A Public Finance Model for Lobbying: Lobbying, Campaign Finance, and the Privatization of
Democracy, 13 ELECTION L.J. 75, 75 (2014). While the oversight is being remedied—Gerken and
Tausanovitch’s observation was made in a 2014 volume of the Election Law Journal that was titled
Under the Influence? Lobbying and Campaign Finance—as recently as 2008 scholars were
continuing to overlook the relationship between lobbying and campaign finance. See Richard
Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
105, 106 (2008) (reporting that this “[a]rticle constitutes a first effort at probing the relationship
between lobbying and campaign finance”).
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its appearance. This Article argues that when evaluating campaign
finance restrictions, it is not enough for courts to balance the risks of
impeding a contributor’s First Amendment rights against the risks of
corruption, as they currently do. They should also balance the risk of
impeding a willing donor’s rights of speech and association against the
risk that, in the absence of effective campaign finance legislation, an
unwilling donor will be induced to speak or associate in a way that does
not reflect his true beliefs. Viewed thus, the unwilling donor may be a
missing key in what often seems to be the riddle of campaign finance
reform.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes how the Supreme
Court has analyzed restrictions on campaign contributions since passage
of the amended Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in 1974,32 with
particular focus on Buckley, which set out the analytical framework, and
McCutcheon, which altered the framework in a way that more starkly
exposes the problem of the unwilling donor. Part II summarizes
evidence that the unwilling donor exists and places the issue in historical
context. Part III considers the implications of the unwilling donor for
campaign finance doctrine. It first contemplates and rejects the
possibility that an individual unwilling donor could and would vindicate
his own interests, thereby affirming both the need for campaign finance
regulation and the fact that these laws must be understood as a structural,
prophylactic reform. It then proposes doctrinal adjustments to the
Supreme Court’s campaign finance framework that might achieve a
balance between the willing and unwilling donor and contemplates how
acknowledgment of the unwilling donor might have changed the
plurality’s analysis in McCutcheon.
I.

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE COURTS

The legal framework for analyzing the constitutionality of campaign
finance restrictions dates back four decades to the passage of FECA and
its partial dismantling by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo. At the
core of FECA and its successor statute, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BCRA),33 are rules governing “hard money,” which are the
only funds that can be contributed directly to a federal candidate, party,

32. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 608 (2012) and 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012)).
33. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 607, 36 U.S.C. §§ 510–511 (2012), 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2012), and in scattered sections of
2 U.S.C. and 52 U.S.C.).
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or political committee and, crucially, the only funds that can be solicited
by candidates or party officials.34 Until challenged in McCutcheon, the
framework that the Court set out in Buckley governed such campaign
contributions. This section outlines the history of campaign finance laws
since the passage of FECA, with a particular focus on the Court’s
treatment of these contributions.
In the discussion that follows, it is helpful to observe the assumptions
and interpretations that inform campaign finance jurisprudence; they
both highlight shifts over time in the Supreme Court’s treatment of
campaign contributions and suggest how the unwilling donor might
affect its analysis in the future. The first is the nature of the rights
impinged. In the context of campaign finance, the Court has adopted the
view that spending money has both an expressive and associative
element (although its understanding of this burden has changed over the
decades), and thus limits on campaign contributions trigger
constitutional scrutiny under the First Amendment.35 The second is the
focus of the First Amendment’s protections. Earlier campaign finance
cases suggested that the primacy of the First Amendment is rooted in the
important role it plays in safeguarding the process through which a
nation fosters an informed and participatory electorate, cutting to the
core of the democratic process.36 More recent opinions, by contrast, have
highlighted the burden campaign finance restrictions place on an
individual donor’s autonomous First Amendment rights.37 The third is
34. Id.; see also supra note 8. “Hard money” is a holdover term from the pre-BCRA era when it
was used to distinguish between party contributions subject to source and use restrictions and those
that could be used for “party building” activities independent of a campaign. See McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122–26 (2003).
35. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (“Some forms of communication made possible
by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and
some involve a combination of the two.”). Contra Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining an opposing view of political campaign money,
neatly summarized as “[m]oney is property; it is not speech” and therefore unprotected by the First
Amendment).
36. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14–15.
37. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (plurality opinion);
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008); FEC v. Wis.
Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); see also ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED 10–43 (2014)
(tracing development of the modern understanding of the First Amendment from the Founding
Fathers to present day and positing that the “First Amendment can remain the guardian of our
democracy only so long as we interpret its requirements to promote the value of selfdetermination”); Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the
Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 806 (2014) (contrasting approaches that
focus on the “organization, structure, and exercise of actual political power” and those that focus on
“protecting and developing the dignity, or the autonomy, or the ‘personhood’ of the individual”);
Mark D. Rosen, The Structural Constitutional Principle of Republican Legitimacy, 54 WM. &
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the government’s interest in regulating campaign contributions. Over the
last four decades, both advocates and the Supreme Court have focused
on the government’s interest in reducing the risk that donors or special
interests pose to the political process; in other words, corruption or the
appearance of corruption.38 Here too the shift in emphasis between
individual and systemic harms is evident. As the Court has moved away
from a structural understanding of the First Amendment rights of speech
and association, it has struggled with the notion of corruption as a
diffuse, non-personalized concept.39 Partially as a result, today campaign
finance outcomes turn on scope at least as much as the level of scrutiny.
Whereas once the Court took a more expansive view of the corruption
risk that campaign finance restrictions could constitutionally target, in its
current narrow iteration it looks like something “akin to bribery,” or the
direct exchange of dollars for an identifiable political favor.40
A.

FECA and Buckley

At the time that Buckley was decided, the problem with money in
politics did not seem to be the unwilling donor so much as the all-toowilling donor. FECA was first passed in 1971, but, as post-Watergate
hearings revealed, during the 1972 elections it was more honored in the
breach.41 Congressional and media investigations exposed a series of
campaign violations in which business interests funneled money to
elected officials, including (especially) President Nixon, in order to
receive favorable treatment from the government.42 In one series of
transactions, the dairy industry sought to increase price supports—
subsidies underwritten by U.S. taxpayers to the tune of $100 million—in
return for a political donation of $2 million, which it channeled through
MARY L. REV. 371 (2012).
38. The Court has also upheld restrictions based on the ancillary justification that in its absence
the statutory scheme could be circumvented. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38. But see supra note
23.
39. See, e.g., Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 388; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; see also Rosen, supra note 37,
at 441–52 (arguing that “Republican Legitimacy,” which elevates structural constitutional
principles, provides a superior framework for analyzing campaign finance restrictions than the
corruption balancing test).
40. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Hasen, supra note 24;
Teachout, supra note 23.
41. S. REP. NO. 93-981, at 579–867 (1974) (describing the exchange of campaign contributions
for political and regulatory favors to industry).
42. See id.; Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 836–40 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (detailing the quick increase in spending in the 1972 election propelled by the
Nixon campaign’s shady and often illegal methods of raising corporate campaign money).
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industry executives and hundreds of PACs.43 Once President Nixon
confirmed that the contributions had been made, he overruled his
Secretary of Agriculture to increase the dairy price supports.44
In response, Congress enacted a more robust version of FECA in
1974.45 The revised law, which was promptly challenged in Buckley,
limited the amount that individuals could contribute as well as the
amount that campaigns could spend, and it required disclosure of both.46
Both restrictions were initially upheld by the circuit court, but on appeal
the Supreme Court allowed only the contribution limits to stand.47 The
Court’s per curiam analysis started with the proposition that restrictions
on campaign contributions and expenditures touch on the core First
Amendment rights of “political association” and “political expression,”
and that these rights protect more than individual, autonomous
interests.48 The Court observed from the outset:
Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of
43. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Op-Ed., Without Limits, Lobbyists Can Be Very Powerful, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/10/06/why-limit-politicaldonations/without-limits-lobbyists-can-be-very-powerful. John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s counsel,
quipped, “[b]etter go get a glass of milk. Drink it while it’s cheap.” Transcript, Meeting Among
President Richard M. Nixon, John B. Connally, John D. Ehrlichman, Clifford M. Hardin, John
Whitaker, George P. Shultz, J. Phil Campbell, Donald B. Rice on March 23, 1971 from 5:05 to 5:38
P.M. in the Oval Office, at 25, available at http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/
watergate/trial/connally_exhibit_1.pdf. It is perhaps no coincidence that around the same era
economists first identified the problem of rent-seeking in public choice theory. See supra note 29.
44. See S. REP. NO. 93-981 (detailing the methods and schemes used to exchange campaign
contributions for price supports in the milk industry); see also Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Justices
Should Think of Quarter Pounders in Latest Money in Politics Case, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST.
BLOG (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/justices-should-think-quarter-pounderslatest-money-politics-case (describing how in 1972 Nixon’s price commission allowed McDonald’s,
and McDonald’s alone, to raise its burger prices after the CEO of McDonald’s donated $250,000 to
Nixon’s reelection campaign).
45. See David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line Between Candidate
Contributions and Independent Expenditures, 14 J.L. & POL. 33, 39 (1998). (“By consensus, the
impetus for passage of the 1974 amendments was the corruption surrounding the fundraising and
campaign spending in the 1972 presidential election.”).
46. See Buckley, 519 F.2d at 851–69.
47. Id. at 841 (noting that while our “nation . . . respects the drive of private profit and the pursuit
of gain, [it] does not exalt wealth thereby achieved to undue preference in fundamental rights” and
finding that “statute taken as a whole affirmatively enhances First Amendment values”); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976).
48. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14–23. Although the Constitution does not explicitly protect the right of
association, the Supreme Court has found it “beyond debate that freedom to engage in association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.” NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–66 (1958).
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government established by our Constitution. The First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political
expression in order to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people. . . . This no more than reflects our profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. In a republic where the
people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make
informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for
the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the
course that we follow as a nation.49
The Court thus subjected the expenditure and contribution caps to a
form of “exacting scrutiny” and considered whether the government had
a compelling interest in enacting the restrictions.50 It found such
justification in the government’s interest in the “prevention of corruption
and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined
coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates’
positions and on their actions if elected to office.”51 In the Court’s view,
the threat of corruption came from special interests seeking to use the
political process to create personal gains at the public’s expense, as with
the dairy cooperative example above.52 In this, it agreed with the lower
court.53
Unlike the circuit court, however, the Supreme Court found that the
government’s anti-corruption interest only justified FECA’s caps on
contributions.54 Money spent directly on campaign expenses such as
advertisements could not be limited, in the Court’s view, because these
funds cut too close to the expressive interests the First Amendment was
designed to protect.55 The Court was less troubled by the First
Amendment burden posed by contribution caps, which it understood to
49. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14–15 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
50. Id. at 14–23. The Court has subsequently applied strict scrutiny to expenditure caps, but it has
declined to extend this analysis to contribution limits. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S.
Ct. 1434, 1444–46 (2014) (plurality opinion); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985).
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
52. Id. at 32; see also supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
53. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 32 n.28.
54. Id. at 27–29.
55. The Court reached this conclusion through an analytical two-step. Because expenditures
related most directly to the communication of ideas, it reasoned, only expenditures relating to
express support for or opposition to a candidate could be regulated—and once one made that
limitation, the potential for circumvention was so significant that any limit was unlikely to address
corruption. Id. at 14–22, 39–50.
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fall more heavily on association rights than speech rights.56 In the
political marketplace of ideas, the act of writing a check does not add
new arguments, rebut existing beliefs, or offer much by way of
persuasion. Because any “expression rests solely on the undifferentiated,
symbolic act of contributing,” the Supreme Court reasoned, “[t]he
quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase
perceptibly with the size of his contribution.”57
The Court supported its decision to let the contribution caps stand
with a few additional observations. First, FECA’s contribution limits
were not so severe as to “prevent[] candidates and political committees
from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”58
Second, a political contributor who faced the cap had other options for
expression and association. He remained “free to become a member of
any political association and to assist personally in the association’s
efforts on behalf of candidates.”59 He also remained free to make
independent expenditures by, for example, running advertisements in
support of a candidate that were neither coordinated with nor requested
by the candidate (a practice that the Buckley Court regarded as providing
only limited benefit to the candidate, who could not control the
message).60 Finally, in regards to the risk of corruption, the contribution
caps were “closely drawn” in that they were targeted to the moment
where money changed hands, with the intent of limiting the risk of a
“quid” in search of a “quo.”61 Of note, the Court rejected the suggestion

56. Id. at 15–16.
57. Id. at 21 (“At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of
the contributor’s support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give
to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but
does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While
contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present
views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by
someone other than the contributor.” (footnotes and citations omitted)).
58. Id.; cf. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 241 (2006) (finding Vermont state contribution limits
were too severe).
59. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.
60. Id. at 45–46.
61. Id. at 1, 28–29 (“The Act’s $1,000 contribution limitation focuses precisely on the problem of
large campaign contributions—the narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and
potential for corruption have been identified—while leaving persons free to engage in independent
political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a
limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial
resources. Significantly, the Act’s contribution limitations in themselves do not undermine to any
material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues
by individual citizens, associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political parties.”
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that bribery statutes, which target individual acts of corruption, offered a
preferable, less restrictive means to fight corruption.62 FECA’s
structural, prophylactic approach to reducing the risk of corruption or its
appearance was both constitutional and within Congress’s mandate.
The Buckley Court also upheld the aggregate caps, or limits on the
total amount that one could directly contribute in an election cycle.63
Although neither party had specifically challenged the aggregate caps, in
its brief discussion of the issue the Court offered two reasons for finding
them valid. First, given that contributions were not expressive beyond
the act of giving, the aggregate caps did not limit any core First
Amendment interest.64 If he wished, a donor could still associate with
every candidate through a contribution of a nominal amount.65 Second,
in the absence of aggregate limits the Court thought it likely that the
base contribution caps would be circumvented by entrepreneurial
donors, a phenomenon that had occurred at a staggering scale during the
1972 election.66 Aggregate caps anticipated some of the more obvious
end runs that overly eager donors might take and shored up the statutory
scheme.
Buckley thus replaced FECA’s comprehensive set of restrictions with
a more piecemeal approach that attempted to balance perceived First
Amendment burdens against the risk of corruption of the political
process. Its analysis drew on the character of the speech protected, the
distinctions between association and speech rights, and the government’s
interest in reducing corruption through structural reform. As described
below, the McCutcheon plurality would shift this analysis in profound
ways, but, perhaps ironically, in doing so it would rely on the same
(citations and footnotes omitted)).
62. Id. at 28 (noting that such laws “deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those
with money to influence governmental action”).
63. Id. at 38 (“The overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate restriction upon the number of
candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of financial
support. But this quite modest restraint upon protected political activity serves to prevent evasion of
the $1,000 contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute massive amounts of
money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political
committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political
party.”).
64. Id. at 36–37.
65. Id. at 38.
66. Id. For example, “American Milk Producers, Inc. avoided being disclosed as providing a $2
million contribution to the Nixon campaign by dividing the funds into $2,500 contributions to
hundreds of political committees, with no more than $2,500 going to any single committee.” Trevor
Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History of Undisclosed Spending in U.S. Elections & How 2012
Became the “Dark Money” Election, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383, 414 (2013).
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flawed point of departure that had animated the Buckley majority:
concerns that large donations by overly animated donors could have a
“coercive influence . . . on candidates[.]”67 The Court left unaddressed
the concern that donors, not candidates, face undue pressure in the
current campaign finance system.
B.

From Buckley to McCutcheon

For the purposes of the present argument, one can cover the ground
from 1976 to 2014 fairly quickly. Buckley, alternatively reviled and
praised, continued to provide the constitutional framework for analyzing
campaign finance restrictions.68 For a time, the Supreme Court took an
expansive view of the nature of the corruption that the government could
constitutionally target through contribution limitations, as well as of the
risk of donors potentially circumventing these limitations, upholding
restrictions justified by the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form”69 and by the appearance of “improper influence” by the
donor.70 To the extent concerns about “extortionate” behavior by
lawmakers were raised (rarely), they were used to validate the
government’s broad interest in addressing corruption.71 The dominant
narrative continued to be that special interests seeking undue political
advantage were attempting to overrun the system with money. 72 “Leave
the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical assumption
that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters
to take part in democratic governance,” the Court wrote in 2000.73

67. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
68. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.
93 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); First
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
69. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
70. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 388–89 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28).
71. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143; Brief of Amici Curiae Bipartisan Former Members of
Congress in Support of Appellees at 2–29, McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (No. 02-1674); see also infra
note 176.
72. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129–33 (detailing the rapid rise of special interest soft
money in the 1990s); FEC v. Col. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 454 (2001)
(“While parties command bigger spending budgets than most individuals, some individuals could
easily rival party committees in spending. Rich political activists crop up, and the United States has
known its Citizens Kane. Their money speaks loudly, too, and they are therefore burdened by
restrictions on its use just as parties are.”).
73. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 390.
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To the extent that campaign finance laws were designed to reduce the
amount of money in federal elections, they have been a failure. Total
election spending grew from $310 million in 1976 to more than $6
billion in 2012.74 In the 1990s, prior FEC rulings that allowed the
national political parties to raise funds largely unrestricted in source or
amount so long as they were not used on “express” advocacy became a
loophole that threatened to overtake traditional election fundraising.75
This rise of unregulated “soft money” and the related phenomenon of
“issue ads”—non-express (and thus non-regulated) advocacy that
seemed nevertheless designed to impact elections—triggered a fresh
round of amendments to FECA, culminating in BCRA in 2002.76 The
revised law kept a cap on hard money contributions to candidates,
affiliated committees, and national parties as to both the base and
aggregate amounts, although it raised both limits significantly and
permitted some of them to be adjusted upward for inflation, an
allowance that FECA had not previously provided.77
In McConnell v. FEC,78 the first challenge to BCRA, the Supreme
Court upheld, inter alia, BCRA’s ban on soft money and restrictions
targeted at the profusion of issue ads by both parties and outside
groups.79 For campaign finance advocates, it was an ephemeral victory.
In the decade following McConnell, the composition of the Supreme
Court changed and so too did its view on the constitutionality of various
provisions of BCRA.80 In a series of decisions, a majority of the Court
74. See FEC, FISCAL YEAR 2008 PERFORMANCE BUDGET FOR THE FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION
1,
6
(2007),
available
at
http://www.fec.gov/pages/budget/fy2008/
fy2008cbj_final.pdf; Russ Choma, The 2012 Election: Our Price Tag (Finally) for the Whole Ball
of Wax, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/03/the-2012election-our-price-tag-fin/ (calculating the 2012 figures as $2.6 billion for the presidential election
and $3.6 billion for congressional elections). The value of $310 million in 1976 was approximately
$1.26 billion in 2012 dollars. See DOLLAR TIMES, http://www.dollartimes.com/
inflation/inflation.php?amount=310000000&year=1976 (last visited July 19, 2015).
75. See FEC Adv. Op. 1978-10 (Aug. 29, 1987); FEC Adv. Op. 1979-17 (July 16, 1979);
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 124 (noting soft money, or funds raised by federal candidates for political
parties that could be spent on anything other than express advocacy, grew from five percent—$21.6
million—of national party spending in 1984 to forty-two percent—$498 million—in 2000); see also
The Money Behind the Elections, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/ (last
visited July 19, 2015).
76. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 607 (2012), 36 U.S.C. §§ 510–511 (2012), 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2012), and in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C. and 52 U.S.C.).
77. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116, 30125(e)(1) (2012).
78. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
79. Id. at 145–46, 225.
80. See Richard L. Hasen, Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp
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took an increasingly robust view of the First Amendment rights of
speakers in a political contest and an increasingly skeptical view of the
fit between campaign finance limitations and the underlying risks of
corruption, the appearance of corruption, or circumvention.81 Most
notably, in Citizens United the Court struck down a ban on corporations
using their general treasury funds (as opposed to PAC dollars) for
independent expenditures that expressly support or oppose a candidate.82
In doing so, the Court narrowed the “compelling interests” that the
government could assert in defense of campaign finance restrictions.83
Both Justice Kennedy and, in a concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts
opined that only quid pro quo corruption was a proper target of
campaign finance expenditure restrictions.84
The First Amendment interests of the donor qua speaker were thus
ascendant as Shaun McCutcheon brought his challenge to BCRA’s
aggregate campaign limits. Where once concerns about access,
influence, and the distortion of wealth may have offered legitimate
grounds on which to find a risk of corruption and uphold campaign
finance restrictions,85 as the Court took up McCutcheon there remained
only two legitimate rationales for campaign finance limitations that
impede a political donor’s ability to express himself freely: the risk of an
actual exchange of dollars for political favors and, relatedly, the risk that
without regulation the safeguards of the campaign finance system might
be circumvented.

Right Turn but with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists 5 (Aug. 4, 2015) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the University of California, Irvine School of Law).
81. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010) (holding that independent expenditures
are not corrupting and striking down ban on corporate independent expenditures and electioneering
communications); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738 (2008) (striking down BCRA’s “Millionaire’s
Amendment”); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (significantly narrowing
BCRA’s definition of “electioneering communications”).
82. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359; id. at 383–84 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
83. The Court explicitly rejected the proposition that the government had a compelling interest in
addressing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of [corporate] wealth that
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas” and appeared to also reject the concept that the
risk of special influence or access in return for a contribution provided constitutional justification
for campaign finance restrictions. Id. at 348 (majority opinion) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
84. Id. at 359; id. at 383–84 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
85. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115–20, 123–31 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 385 (2000); Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
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McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission

Shaun McCutcheon was a staunch Republican who wished to give at
least $1776 to more than twenty-five candidates’ campaigns in the
2011–2012 election cycle.86 In 2012, he filed a lawsuit asserting his right
to make contributions within the base limits but in excess of the
aggregate limits. The question that received little attention in Buckley
thus returned to the Court in center stage.87
Supreme Court briefing and oral argument in McCutcheon focused on
the classic campaign finance protagonist: the willing or even over-eager
donor.88 A significant amount of argument time—and the resulting
opinions—dwelt on the risk that a donor might circumvent the base
limits if the aggregate caps were removed.89 Chief Justice Roberts’
plurality opinion expressed skepticism that candidates and parties would
engage in complicated transactions in order to funnel more than the
permitted amount of money from a single donor to a single candidate or
slate of candidates; the dissent, authored by Justice Breyer, was
significantly less skeptical.90
Ultimately, however, the aggregate limits fell because they were not
drawn, in the plurality’s view, closely enough to advance the

86. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10–13, McCutcheon v. FEC, 893
F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 12-1034), available at https://cases.justia.com/federal/districtcourts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2012cv01034/154907/1/0.pdf?ts=1376358875. The Republican
National Committee was also a party in the suit. Id. at 1.
87. As an initial matter, a majority of Justices rejected the notion that the Court was bound by
Buckley’s treatment of the issue. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444–46
(2014) (plurality opinion); id. at 1462–65 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment only). The plurality
opinion noted that the parties there had not presented arguments on the aggregate limits and that the
Court’s reasoning on the matter had encompassed only a few sentences. Id. at 1438 (plurality
opinion).
88. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (No. 12-536)
[hereinafter McCutcheon Transcript]; Brief for Appellant Shaun McCutcheon, McCutcheon, 134 S.
Ct. 1434 (No. 12-536); Brief on the Merits for Appellant Republican National Committee,
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (No. 12-536); Brief for the Appellee, McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434
(No. 12-536); Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Rights Union in Support of Appellants,
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (No. 12-536); Brief of Americans for Campaign Reform as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellee, McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (No. 12-536). More than twenty-five
briefs were filed with the Supreme Court in the case.
89. McCutcheon Transcript, supra note 88, at 3–55; McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442–49, 1452–
62; id. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment only); id. at 1465–67, 1471–80 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
90. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1454–56 (plurality opinion) (dismissing circumvention
scenarios described by the Government as “implausible” and “divorced from reality”); id. at 1473–
77 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing three detailed examples of how circumvention could be
achieved).
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government’s compelling interests.91 The Justices who formed the
plurality posed two questions during oral argument that the Solicitor
General struggled to answer. First, why was contributing up to the base
limit to a tenth candidate more corrupting than giving the same amount
to the previous nine?92 Second, how could the government justify its
fears about the risk of removing the aggregate limit on direct
contributions when restrictions on independent expenditures are virtually
non-existent?93 That is, why should the Court be concerned about the
corrupting influence of the $5200 a donor could contribute directly to a
candidate when the same donor could independently spend $40 million
running ads supporting her candidacy? Surely, the plurality reasoned, the
latter act would engender the same or higher levels of gratitude in the
beneficiary.94
Apparently receiving no satisfactory answer, the plurality determined
that the aggregate caps were not narrowly tailored to address the
corruption risk.95 It is here that the plurality made the doctrinal shift that
has attracted by far the most commentary: It explicitly narrowed the
grounds upon which campaign finance contribution restrictions could be
constitutionally justified.96 Notwithstanding its dismissal of “just three
sentences” on aggregate limits in Buckley, the plurality seized on three
words from that same opinion—quid pro quo—to limit the kind of

91. Id. at 1456 (plurality opinion). The Court declined to adopt strict scrutiny to analyze
contribution restrictions, id. at 1445–46, but several commentators, including Justice Thomas in his
concurrence, have observed that there seems to be little room between the approach the plurality
took and strict scrutiny, see id. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment only); Hasen, supra
note 24 (arguing that the plurality’s “strict corruption” approach does the work of “strict scrutiny”).
92. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (plurality opinion); McCutcheon Transcript, supra note 88, at
46–47.
93. McCutcheon Transcript, supra note 88, at 30–35.
94. Id. at 34; see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1454. Justice Kagan’s suggestion that the Court
could revisit its ruling that independent expenditures are not corrupting in the campaign context was
met with laughter. McCutcheon Transcript, supra note 88, at 54; cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868, 888–89 (2009) (finding that large independent expenditures risked
compromising judicial impartiality).
95. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456–57 (finding that the caps were not “closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25
(1976))).
96. Id. at 1444; see, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions After
McCutcheon, Citizens United, and Speech Now, 67 FLA. L. REV. 389, 469–70 (2015); Liz Kennedy
& Seth Katsuya Endo, The World According to, and After, McCutcheon v. FEC, and Why It
Matters, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 533, 552–562 (2015); Marc E. Elias & Jonathan S. Berkon, After
McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. 373 (2014); see also supra note 23. The Court had made a similar
determination regarding independent expenditures in Citizens United. Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310, 336 (2010).
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corruption that Congress is permitted to target without running afoul of
the First Amendment.97 Thus, after McCutcheon, only the government’s
concerns about the actual exchange of “dollars for political favors” can
justify campaign contribution limitations.98 Moreover, the plurality
wrote, “the risk of quid pro quo corruption is generally applicable only
to the ‘narrow category of money gifts that are directed, in some manner,
to a candidate or officeholder.’”99
Less widely noted but also critical for the present discussion, the
McCutcheon plurality also re-framed the constitutional interests at issue.
The Buckley Court had found that “the primary First Amendment
problem raised by the Act’s contribution limitations is their restriction of
one aspect of the contributor’s freedom of political association”; it is the
act of giving rather than the amount that triggers the First Amendment
concerns, and those concerns are more about association than speech.100
The McCutcheon plurality, however, rejected the notion that the amount
given is not constitutionally significant.101 In its view, more money
97. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448–52. The dissent would have continued to apply the
comparatively broad definition of corruption that the Court had used in McConnell and earlier cases.
Id. at 1169–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In a dissent joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, Justice Breyer faulted the plurality for not explicitly overturning this fairly recent precedent.
Id. at 1471.
98. Id. at 1441 (plurality opinion) (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 457
U.S. 480, 497 (1985)). The Court has taken a more expansive view of the risk of corruption in
judicial elections. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (upholding a
state law banning judges from personally soliciting campaign funds for their campaigns); Caperton,
556 U.S. at 873, 884 (requiring recusal of a judge who received $3 million in judicial campaign
contributions from a litigant).
99. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451–52 (emphasis in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 90, 310 (2003)); see also Mark D. Rosen, When Are Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute?
McCutcheon, Conflicts, and the Sufficiency Question, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1535, 1606–09
(2015) (faulting the plurality for concluding in this context “that no other countervailing
consideration or set of considerations is sufficiently important to permit a speech limitation”). The
plurality suggested that narrower restrictions on earmarking and transfers might pass constitutional
muster, but this would require action from either Congress or the FEC, both of which have reached
near-historic levels of gridlock. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1458–59; see also Jennifer Mueller,
Defending Nuance in an Era of Tea Party Politics: An Argument for the Continued Use of
Standards to Evaluate the Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4) Organizations, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV.
103, 153–55 (2014) (describing recent FEC dysfunction); cf. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. __,
133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (noting, after striking down part of the Voting Rights Act, that
Congress could pass a revised law with an appropriate coverage formula, something that has not
happened and seems unlikely to happen in the near future). See generally Richard L. Hasen, End of
the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205
(2013) (discussing how increased polarization of Congress has resulted in a decline of congressional
overrides of Supreme Court decisions).
100. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24.
101. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449 (“To require one person to contribute at lower levels than
others because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on
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equals more speech, and thus any limit burdens both the speech and
association rights of a contributor.102
In so ruling, the McCutcheon plurality emphasized the role of the
First Amendment in creating and protecting rights for individuals, as
opposed to any larger structural role it may play.103 In contrast, the
Buckley majority, as demonstrated by the language quoted above,
highlighted the role of the First Amendment in protecting and creating
informed political choice.104 It is perhaps a crude measure, but it is worth
noting that the word “individual” appears nowhere in the section of
Buckley that lays out the “general principles” that provided the
constitutional foundation for the decision.105 It appears more than a
dozen times in the parallel section of McCutcheon.106 It is, however,
difficult to balance a particularized individual right against a more
amorphous structural value.107 Thus, the McCutcheon plurality could
broader participation in the democratic process.”).
102. Id. at 1456; see also Justin Levitt, Electoral Integrity: The Confidence Game, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. ONLINE 70, 84–85 (2014) (arguing that the plurality’s framing of the aggregate limits as
denying an individual “all ability to exercise his associational and expressive rights by contributing
to someone who will advocate for his policy preferences,” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448, is “a
description of burden as dangerously unmoored as the most unbounded assertion of regulation in the
name of electoral integrity,” Levitt, supra).
103. The dissent took issue with this characterization. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the First Amendment advances not only the individual’s right
to engage in political speech, but also the public’s interest in preserving a democratic order in which
collective speech matters,” and adding that this purpose “has everything to do with corruption”). But
see id. at 1449–50 (plurality opinion) (rejecting “such a generalized conception of the public
good”). Cf. Pildes, supra note 37; Rosen, supra note 37; Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648
(1998) (“Rather than seeking to control politics directly through the centralized enforcement of
individual rights, we suggest courts would do better to examine the background structure of partisan
competition.”).
104. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14–24. The McCutcheon dissent made much of this history. See
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Eighty-seven years ago, Justice Brandeis
wrote that the First Amendment’s protection of speech was ‘essential to effective democracy.’
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (concurring opinion). Chief Justice Hughes
reiterated the same idea shortly thereafter: ‘A fundamental principle of our constitutional system’ is
the ‘maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be
responsive to the will of the people.’ Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).”); cf. POST,
supra note 37, at 13–43 (describing the changing role of the First Amendment in American political
history).
105. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14–23.
106. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448–50. For example, “[a]s relevant here, the First Amendment
safeguards an individual’s right to participate in the public debate through political expression and
political association. . . . When an individual contributes money to a candidate, he exercises both of
those rights.” Id. at 1448.
107. Cf. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 166–74 (2011) (reporting on
experiments that demonstrated subjects’ preference for—and reliance on—individual examples
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write that “[i]n drawing [the] line [between illegal quid pro quo
corruption and legal generalized influence], the First Amendment
requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than
suppressing it.”108 A tie between individual rights and structural
concerns goes to the individual rights of the speaker, and so it follows
that only individual corruption—acts of quid pro quo exchange—can
provide a counterweight. As discussed further below, this framework
assumes a great deal about the willingness of the donor and the nature of
the speech protected.
As to Buckley’s other rationales in support of upholding the
contribution cap, the plurality considered and dismissed the possibility
that an alternative route existed for a donor wishing to exercise his rights
of association if the caps remained in place. For a donor like Mr.
McCutcheon who wished to support many candidates, the plurality
reasoned that volunteering individually with every campaign could
prove too burdensome.109 The plurality did not, however, address
whether suitable alternative channels existed through which a donor
could exercise his free speech rights even if the caps remained (e.g.,
independent expenditures).110 Neither did it discuss whether the
aggregate caps posed “any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of
campaigns and political associations.”111 More peculiarly, it considered
only briefly the concern that in the absence of the aggregate cap
candidates could solicit up to $3.6 million from an individual donor.112

rather than statistical probabilities when explaining events).
108. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457
(2007)). The Buckley Court had considered a nearly identical overbreadth challenge and rejected it.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30 (recognizing the likelihood that some non-corrupting speech would be
curtailed by the contribution limits but finding that “Congress was justified in concluding that the
interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for
abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated”).
109. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449.
110. The plurality’s failure to consider whether a donor’s ability to spend unlimited amounts on
independent expenditures eased any First Amendment burden posed by contribution caps may have
been a “tell.” Commentators have opined that the plurality was motivated in part by recognition that
in recent election cycles, and especially since Citizens United, the power of political parties has
diminished vis à vis outside groups such as SuperPACs. See, e.g., Anthony J. Gaughan, In Defense
of McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 221, 254–60 (2015);
Lee Drutman, What the McCutcheon Decision Means, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/02/what-the-mccutcheondecision-means/. The decision in McCutcheon will certainly be to the parties’ benefit. See infra note
300.
111. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
112. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456; see Peter Olsen-Phillips, Joint Fundraisers Ballooning
After McCutcheon Decision, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2014, 3:12 PM),
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This last point is worth pausing upon, as it comes closest to touching
on the concerns of the unwilling donor.113 The Government argued that
the aggregate limits should be upheld for two reasons. The first
justification—and the primary focus of the arguments and opinions—
was that they helped prevent circumvention of the base limits, as the
Buckley Court had held. A second, less-developed argument advanced
by the Government was that without the aggregate caps the sheer
amount of money that a candidate or elected official could solicit—in
the name not only of her own campaign, but also, through leadership
PACs114 or joint fundraising committees,115 of her colleagues and state
and national party committees—had the potential to corrupt, or at least
appear to corrupt, the most well-intentioned of officials.116 The
aggregate limits, the Government suggested, served an independent anticorruption function in addition to an anti-circumvention function. The

http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/10/29/joint-fundraisers-ballooning-after-mccutcheondecision/ (reporting that by late 2014, candidates and parties had formed over 200 joint fundraising
committees). In the wake of Congress’s appropriations act passed in December 2014, candidates can
now solicit $5.1 million from an individual donor. See Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, div. N, § 101, 128 Stat. 2130, 2772–73 (2014) (to
be codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30116) (raising the contribution caps and permitting national party
committees to establish separate accounts, each with elevated contribution limits of $100,200
annually).
113. The fact that the plurality, concurrence, and dissent spent so little time considering the
coercive effects of the large amounts of money about to flow directly to candidates and parties—the
issue arguably most germane to the unwilling donor—likely reflects the scant attention it received
by the parties and amici. See Justin Levitt, Symposium: Aggregate Limits and the Fight over Frame,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 16, 2013, 9:57 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/symposiumaggregate-limits-and-the-fight-over-frame/ (noting that the role of elected officials and candidates in
leveraging contributions was largely ignored in the filings).
114. A Leadership PAC pays for expenses that are ineligible for coverage by campaign
committees or congressional offices, such as certain travel and funding for other candidates’
campaigns. See Leadership PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/
indus.php?ind=Q03 (last updated July 2015); see also infra notes 127, 199.
115. Created by two or more PACs, party committees, or candidates, joint fundraising
committees share fundraising costs and split fundraising proceeds, with the caveat that a donor
cannot give more money to the joint committee than he could give directly to each candidate.
However, the donor can write a single check for several candidates. See Joint Fundraising
Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/jfc/ (last visited July 20, 2015). For
example, in the 2014 cycle, the top twenty donors to the Boehner for Speaker joint fundraising
committee made contributions between $133,000 and $425,300. Boehner for Speaker Cmte,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/jfc/donors.php?id=C00478354&cycle=2014 (last
visited July 20, 2015).
116. McCutcheon Transcript, supra note 88, at 46–54. The plurality seemed to suggest that these
arguments were raised for the first time at oral argument, see McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1460, but
they were made, albeit briefly, in the Government’s brief, Brief for the Appellee, supra note 88, at
53–54.
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plurality rejected this argument.117
After McCutcheon, it appears that the Supreme Court has moved from
viewing campaign finance restrictions as appropriate tools by which the
government may attempt systemic reform to viewing them as acceptable
means of backstopping existing anti-corruption criminal laws, such as
those outlawing bribery.118 Likewise, the focus appears to be less on the
value of political speech to our representative system of government and
more on the First Amendment rights of individual citizens.119 These
rhetorical shifts are complicated if one introduces the idea that some
donors in fact are not willing contributors.
II.

LOOKING FOR THE UNWILLING DONOR

A political observer may greet the notion of the unwilling or reluctant
donor with some skepticism. Not only does such a concept defy the
conventional narrative, but there is perhaps an instinctive resistance to it.
After all, neither politics nor wealth typically engender feelings of
sympathy, and in recent election cycles some donors have commanded
the media spotlight with prominent commitments of money in support of
one party or the other.120 This is not an article about independent
117. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1440–41, 1460–62 (“For our purposes here, it is enough that the
aggregate limits at issue are not directed specifically to candidate behavior.”).
118. Commentators have noted that despite the apparent clarity of “quid pro quo,” it provides
little if any direction to a legislator or regulator in the campaign finance context. Zephyr Teachout
notes this tension in a forthcoming Article:
Courts use different techniques to limit the potentially awesome reach of [bribery] statutes:
they require that the bribe be express (spoken or written), or they require that the governmental
action required be identified. Sometimes they use the term “quid pro quo” to serve these
limiting functions. . . . [But] these important roles are not relevant when judging whether a
bright-line statute is legitimately motivated by [a] compelling need to stop corruption. In the
campaign finance context, they serve a different function. They provide a sense . . . of clearly
defined and definable scope. Perhaps the reason the Court is so drawn to it is that the use of the
contract language (quid pro quo) gives a false sense of specificity to a concept that is
essentially awkward in the criminal law context. The increased emphatic use of “quid pro quo”
provides a psychological experience of certainty, as the Latinate sounds more particular than
non-particular. It sounds tractable. . . . At an emotional level, the language sounds concrete
enough to overcome the essential ambiguity with proof of intent and motive in corruption
cases.
Zephyr Teachout, McCutcheon and the Meaning of Corruption: Not All Quid Pro Quos Are Made
of the Same Stuff 21 (Fordham Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2387041, 2014) (emphasis
in original), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2387041.
119. Robert Post suggests that the First Amendment has twin goals of protecting both
representative government, centered around elections as decision points, and “discursive
democracy,” in which citizens are in regular communication with elected officials and officials are
responsive to the public on an ongoing basis, which roughly tracks this divide in emphasis. See
POST, supra note 37, at 36–42, 59–66.
120. See, e.g., Steven Bertoni, Billionaire Sheldon Adelson Says He Might Give $100M to Newt
Gingrich
or
Other
Republican,
FORBES
(Feb.
21,
2012,
12:04
AM),

12 - Mueller.docx (Do Not Delete)

1808

12/21/2015 8:08 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1783

expenditures, however, and sympathy is not a constitutional touchstone.
This section develops the narrative of the unwilling donor and identifies
significant evidence of his existence, not just in the present day but also
in events precipitating earlier campaign finance laws.
A.

Two Stories About Campaign Finance

McCutcheon shows the continued dominance of the campaign finance
narrative that informed Buckley. In this story, self-serving business
people with deep pockets—the nefarious “special interests”—dangle
large amounts of money before candidates to sway their actions.121 This
story has a long and sordid pedigree, and there is abundant evidence to
suggest that the capture of public officials and agencies by private
interests remains a valid concern—thus the unease by Justices in earlier
campaign finance cases about donor “access” and “influence.”122
However, one could quite as easily tell an alternative story about
campaign contributions and donors today, one in which donors are less
complicit and more coerced. This alternate narrative, one for which there
is considerable support, both complicates traditional campaign finance
doctrine and offers a new framework for evaluating campaign finance
restrictions.
Consider two donors. The first is the person whom the McCutcheon
plurality appears to have had as its frame of reference.123 Let’s call him
Mr. Gold. He is quite wealthy and wishes to become politically involved

http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenbertoni/2012/02/21/billionaire-sheldon-adelson-says-he-mightgive-100m-to-newt-gingrich-or-other-republican/ (detailing a Forbes interview with billionaire
Sheldon Adelson, who said he was willing to spend $100 million to beat President Obama); see also
supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441–42; id. at 1469–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–27 (1975); Brief for the Attorney Gen. and the Fed. Election
Comm’n at 22, Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (Nos. 75-436, 75-437) (“[Restoration of public confidence] is a
critical [objective] in times of deep public suspicion and apathy grounded in the citizens’ belief that
‘their’ representatives are often captives of wealthy special interests.”).
122. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124–26 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 388–89 (2000); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990);
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25–27.
123. More than one critic has referred to the plurality’s opinion as “naïve.” See Billy Corriher,
Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence Displays a Naïve View of Political Corruption,
CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/civilliberties/news/2014/04/02/87044/supreme-courts-campaign-finance-jurisprudence-displays-a-naiveview-of-political-corruption/; Richard L. Hasen, Symposium: Does the Chief Justice Not
Understand Politics, or Does He Understand It All Too Well?, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 3, 2014, 10:38
AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/symposium-does-the-chief-justice-not-understandpolitics-or-does-he-understand-it-all-too-well/; Posner, supra note 23.
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in order to support candidates for office who support laws with which he
agrees. Some of those laws might benefit him personally or financially,
while others reflect the kind of future he hopes for America. Mr. Gold
does not have a “nefarious” side agenda or significant lobbying interest.
He just wants to support all of the candidates and party committees that
agree with his policy positions to the maximum extent he is fortunate
and able to do so. The money that Mr. Gold contributes to each
candidate is spent on expressive speech in support of their candidacy (or
possibly to attack their opponents). If Mr. Gold’s candidates win and
support or oppose measures in the legislature in a way that aligns with
his views, that is just a natural result of the political process and the way
representative democracy is supposed to work. If Mr. Gold explicitly
asks for anything in return for his campaign contributions, that is bribery
and illegal under both federal and state law. To deny Mr. Gold the
opportunity to participate in the electoral process through making
campaign contributions to the maximum extent he wishes to do so would
be to deny him his core First Amendment rights of expression and
association.
But one could tell—and some have124—another story. We might
imagine another wealthy individual; let’s call him Mr. Silver. Mr. Silver
is not very interested in politics, but he does care about his business and
he believes he has a responsibility to safeguard its future and
profitability—for his employees, board of directors, shareholders, or just
his personal sense of duty. He learns that there is a proposed piece of
legislation making its way through Congress that is likely to impact this
business. He calls his representative and lets her know he is concerned
about the bill. The next day Mr. Silver receives a call from his
representative’s chief fundraiser inviting him to a fundraising dinner
with her next week. They notice he has not donated before. (Or perhaps
he has donated before—$250 for a fundraiser hosted by Mr. Silver’s
friend a few years ago. The analysis would not be different. Likewise,
the story does not depend on the existence of proposed legislation or
who initiates the contact; every industry is regulated or could be
regulated.) The price for the fundraiser is $2500. He is also encouraged
to support her leadership PAC, which can accept a donation of up to
$10,000 per two-year cycle.125
Mr. Silver does not feel strongly about this representative—not $2500
124. See SCHWEIZER, supra note 27; JACK ABRAMOFF, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: THE HARD TRUTH
ABOUT WASHINGTON CORRUPTION FROM AMERICA’S MOST NOTORIOUS LOBBYIST 270–72 (2011);
MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 45–68.
125. See supra notes 110, 114.
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strongly, and certainly not $10,000 strongly—but he is aware that he is
asking her to do something for him, so he feels obligated to do
something for her. He may even talk to a politically connected friend of
his, who advises him that he must “pay to play.” He attends the dinner,
which is at an expensive steakhouse, and speaks with the candidate
about the proposed legislation. She indicates that the upcoming vote
poses tough issues, and that she believes the other party is mobilizing on
the other side. She asks what the legislative change could cost his
company. She encourages him to donate to the national party
committees and suggests that other people at his company would be
welcome to “join the fight.” She lets him know that she looks at donor
lists each week and thanks him for his contribution. She mentions one or
two colleagues who she thinks would appreciate his support and who she
believes could be favorably inclined toward his point of view (although
she politely declines to commit her own vote). The week before the vote,
the representative’s fundraiser reaches out to Mr. Silver and asks if he’s
given to her joint fundraising committee, which supports the party and
like-minded candidates.126 She believes others are giving at the $15,000
level. Again, Mr. Silver does not want to give, but he feels he cannot say
no given how much is riding on the bill. He is ambivalent about his
representative—he has never had a big interest in politics, and he didn’t
even vote for her—but he cares very much about the legislation, and he
would hate to think that he did not do everything in his power to make a
difference, especially as the requested contribution, while uncomfortably
large as a symbol of his support, is nevertheless far smaller than the
bill’s potential impact. He writes another check. It is still more than a
year until the representative’s election, and while some of the money he
contributes does eventually get spent in political advertisements, more of
it is spent on lavish fundraiser events, including long weekends at an
exclusive spa resort and meals at her favorite sushi restaurant. It also
helps her secure a position in the party leadership.127 As for Mr. Silver,
126. While congressional ethics rules ban a lawmaker from soliciting funds from a corporation
while also working on legislation supported by that corporation, these often fail to constrain such
activity. See generally STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ETHICS, IN THE MATTER OF ALLEGATIONS
RELATING TO FUNDRAISING ACTIVITIES AND THE HOUSE VOTE ON H.R. 4173, H.R. 112-4137, 1ST
SESS. (2011), available at http://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/documents/Wall%
20Street%20Bill%20Report_Final.pdf (finding no appearance of impropriety when Members
attended fundraisers with donors interested in pending financial services legislation because, inter
alia, the Members used separate staff for fundraising and the events were open to donors outside the
financial services industry).
127. Evidence suggests that some of these funds may in fact be used to directly influence
legislative outcomes, but such expenditures are made by elected officials, not contributors.
Observers have tracked transfers from the leadership PACs of both parties’ political leadership to
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over the coming months his phone begins to ring more and more
frequently with calls from fundraisers from both parties. He continues to
give, fearing repercussions if he does not.128
Of course, each of these stories might be true for some donors at some
times. But only one appears in campaign finance jurisprudence. Mr.
Silver’s story is not about “the unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people” or
“the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices.”129 It is, rather,
about citizens who do not wish to make political contributions but do not
feel that they can say no because they are afraid of the consequences if
they do not.130 It is a story that captures what game theorists might call
the rational coercion of our current campaign finance system. 131 Political
other elected officials and found them to be closely correlated, in timing and outcome, to recipient’s
support for the donor’s legislative initiatives or support for donor’s leadership run. SCHWEIZER,
supra note 27, at 68–73; see also Paul Blumenthal, Potential House Health Care Vote Switchers
Reliant on Party Campaign Money, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Mar. 3, 2010, 12:02 PM),
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2010/03/03/potential-house-health-care-vote-switchers-relianton-party-campaign-money/; Kent Cooper, Paul Ryan’s PAC Provides $80,000 to Members on Key
Standing Committees, ROLL CALL (Oct. 18, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/
moneyline/paul-ryan-provides-80000-to-members-on-key-standing-committees/.
128. Mr. Silver is a hypothetical character, but it bears mentioning that real life individuals have
found themselves in similar situations. In 1973, George Spater, former chairman and CEO of
American Airlines, testified before Congress that he directed that $75,000 be given to the
Committee to Reelect the President not because he supported President Nixon’s candidacy but
because “I was fearful if I didn’t do it our company would be placed at a competitive disadvantage.”
Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972: Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Presidential
Campaign Activities of the U.S. Senate, 93d Cong. 5511 (1973) (statement of George Spater, former
chairman and CEO of American Airlines). More recently, researchers interviewed a “person who
worked for an outside group that also made PAC contributions” who reported “being ‘shaken down’
for money by Members, including being screamed at by Members and told things like a ‘$1,000
contribution is demeaning.’” DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E.B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY:
OUTSIDE
SPENDING
IN
CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS
(2014),
available
at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/thenewsoftmoney/wp-content/uploads/sites/57/2014/06/the-new-softmoney-WEB.pdf; see also supra notes 19, 26.
129. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976).
130. While beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that Mr. Silver’s story is also about
candidates who feel they must make the most of every fundraising opportunity because they know
many of their opponents—or their opponents’ fundraising teams—will do the same. See, e.g., Brief
of Amici Curiae Bipartisan Former Members of Congress in Support of Appellees at 3–14,
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (No. 02-1674) (“Members of Congress quickly learn that if
they do not provide time and attention to large donors, and if they do not act to influence or
acquiesce in legislative decisions favoring such large donors, then they and their party are likely to
be at a serious disadvantage.”); TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 128, at 90 (“In numerous
interviews, both with Members and with staff, we heard that the possibility for large amounts of
outside spending had created an even greater sense of urgency to raise as much money as possible
for their own campaigns than existed in years past and that as a result, candidates spent more time
on the phone asking for money.”).
131. See, e.g., Anne Tucker, Rational Coercion: Citizens United and a Modern Day Prisoner’s
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choice theorists might call it rent extraction.132 Others call it extortion.133
The next two sections consider evidence that this story may be a viable
counter-narrative to the one that has occupied the Supreme Court for the
last four decades; the Part following considers the doctrinal implications.
B.

Signs of the Unwilling Donor

What is perhaps most remarkable about the unwilling donor is how
long his story has been overlooked. The bribery narrative is so pervasive
that notwithstanding testimony during the Watergate hearings that
certain donors to Nixon’s reelection campaign contributed solely out of
fear of repercussions if they did not, the word “extortion” barely even
appears in any of the Supreme Court’s campaign finance cases.134
There is a parallel here to public choice theory, which applies an
economic cost-benefit analysis to explain how political choices are
made.135 For a long time public choice scholars explained government
policy choices through a model that bore echoes of the dominant
campaign finance narrative described above, a model in which the
motives of an interested donor, as a “purchaser,” or “rent seeker,” drove
a transaction and set its price. Regulatory inefficiencies (in which the

Dilemma, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105 (2011). The donor-candidate dynamic is a rich area for game
theorists. From parallels to the classic prisoner’s dilemma to more nuanced considerations of repeat
players, signaling, coalition dynamics, and free rider problems, academics look for models to
predict contribution patterns. See, e.g., id.; Marcos Chamon & Ethan Kaplan, The Iceberg Theory of
Campaign Contributions: Political Threats and Interest Group Behavior, 5 AM. ECON. J.: ECON.
POL’Y 1 (2013). For present purposes, however, it is enough to understand that many wealthy
donors are likely to give if asked regardless of their policy preferences; the risk to an unwilling
donor’s business interests should a lawmaker not be favorably inclined to him is such that the
contribution is a reasonable hedge. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 30; Racquel Meyer Alexander,
Stephen W. Mazza & Susan Scholz, Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying Expenditures: An
Empirical Case Study of Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations (2009) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
132. See supra notes 28–30.
133. SCHWEIZER, supra note 27; Fitzpatrick & Griffin, supra note 26.
134. In fact, extortion is mentioned in only two Supreme Court cases discussing political
campaigns since Buckley, and then only in passing. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 471
(2010) (Stevens, J. concurring) (citing Sitkoff, supra note 31, at 1113); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349 n.12 (1995) (quoting the language of a statute). Interestingly, earlier
cases gave it slightly more due. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 606 (1973) (suggesting
that campaign restrictions serve a valid state interest in protecting against “political extortion”);
United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S.
567, 579 (1957) (discussing how unions extorted dues from union workers, which were later used as
political contributions).
135. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 276–77 (1988).
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outcome was not optimized for the public benefit) were explained by
uncovering private donors’ improper attempts to “capture” a public
good.136 Public choice scholars observed, however, that some
transactions did not fit this empirical model.137 It was nearly three
decades before Fred McChesney, building off of earlier studies,
identified the critical oversight in his analysis of public choice theory,
Money for Nothing.138 Previous scholarship, he noted, had failed to
account for a key figure in the story of legislative and regulatory change:
the motivated public official as the “seller,” or “rent extractor.”
Professor McChesney reported that whereas “many episodes of private
payment are simply inexplicable” as economically efficient acts
benefiting the rent seeker, they make sense if understood to be made
“not for particular political favors, but to avoid particular political
disfavor, that is, as part of a system of political
extortion . . . [representing] a conscious, welfare-maximizing strategy
for politicians personally.”139
Professor McChesney’s observations showed that there is something
to be gained in teasing apart differences that might at first appear to be
merely subjective or rhetorical. After all, bribery and extortion are not
very different concepts; one might call them the opposite sides of the
same coin. But just as recognizing the phenomenon of rent extraction
helped demonstrate the validity of and further refine public choice
theory, viewing campaign finance doctrine through the frame of the
unwilling donor allows us to see gaps in the Supreme Court’s campaign
finance jurisprudence and test the robustness of its formulations. As will
be discussed further in the concluding sections of this Article, flipping
the story of campaign finance brings certain concerns into sharp relief. It
reinforces the coercive nature of the campaign finance system and the
need for systemic reform, it destabilizes the Court’s current emphasis on
quid pro quo corruption, and it elevates the First Amendment interests of
the donor who feels he must contribute in ways that do not align with his
true political preferences.
136. Buchanan, supra note 29; Krueger, supra note 29.
137. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 9–19, 158–59; see also id. at 18 (“Observers note that
creation of rents does not seem to explain many of the regulatory statutes that legislators have
enacted. Yet the principal theorists of the economic model cling to procrustean notions of rent
creation to describe regulation, even when some groups clearly are made worse off, and even when
those losses outweigh the gains to other groups.”).
138. See generally id. See also id. at 73 (crediting Roger Beck, Colin Hoskins, and Martin
Connolly as being the “first to have discussed and systemically tested the competing hypotheses
concerning rent extraction”).
139. Id. at 2–3.
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First, however, we must be sure that this alternative narrative holds
water. There is considerable evidence that the unwilling donor is a real
and growing phenomenon; indeed, there are entire books on the
subject.140 Some of this evidence is circumstantial, such as individuals
and PACs who give generously to both parties, suggesting that
something beyond ideology may be motivating these donors.141 In the
2013–2014 election cycle, 20,301 donors gave to both Democrats and
Republicans, with the total donations favoring Republicans fifty-two
percent to thirty-eight percent.142 These trends are more revealing when
individual and PAC donations are viewed together. For example,
according to the Center for Responsive Politics, between 1989 and 2014
the National Association of Realtors PAC and employees spent nearly
$68 million on political contributions and independent expenditures—
forty-eight percent to Democrats or liberal groups and fifty-two percent
to Republicans or conservative groups.143 For J.P. Morgan Chase over
the same time period, the split was forty-eight percent Democrat to fiftythree percent Republican; for AT&T, forty-two percent to fifty-eight

140. See, e.g., SCHWEIZER, supra note 27.
141. See Top Organization Contributors, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/
orgs/list.php (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) (listing the top 100 organizational donors, of whom fortysix gave at least thirty percent of their contributions to the “other” party). This split by corporate
interests is all the more notable given that most individual big donors do appear to favor one party
over the other. Compare Totals by Sector, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/
bigpicture/sectors.php?cycle=2012&bkdn=DemRep&sortBy=Rank (last visited July 20, 2015)
(showing a relatively even split between industries over time), with Lee Drutman, The Political 1%
of the 1% in 2012, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (June 24, 2013, 9:00 AM)
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/24/1pct_of_the_1pct/ (reporting that in 2012 nearly half
of the big donors gave ninety percent or more of their contributions to Republicans and roughly a
third gave more than ninety percent to Democrats). Indeed, under a game theory rubric, some
studies suggest that an outcome-oriented donor can generally achieve his preferred result through
donations to only one party. See Chamon & Kaplan, supra note 131. Nevertheless, according to the
Center for Responsive Politics, in the most recent election cycle more than 20,000 individual donors
gave to both parties, with more than 7000 donors giving at least thirty-three percent to each
Democrats and Republicans. Donor Demographics, supra note 9. This is far more than the number
of donors who “maxed out” in hard money contributions in 2012. In 2012, 2972 donors hit the
aggregate committee limits and 591 hit the aggregate candidate limits. McCutcheon vs FEC,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/mccutcheon.php (last visited July 21,
2015). Only 646 donors hit the maximum overall donation limit. Bob Biersack, McCutcheon’s
Multiplying Effect: Why an Overall Limit Matters, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 17, 2013),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/09/mccutcheons-multiplying-effect-why/.
142. Donor Demographics, supra note 9 (the remaining percentages went to PACs). According to
Politifact, from 1989–2012 real estate mogul Donald Trump gave $497,690 to Republicans and
$581,350 to Democrats; it is only in recent years that his contributions have heavily favored
Republicans. See Cabaniss, supra note 15.
143. Top Organization Contributors, supra note 141.

12 - Mueller.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

12/21/2015 8:08 PM

THE UNWILLING DONOR

1815

percent; for Microsoft, fifty-six percent to forty-four percent.144
Others point to large amounts of money donated disproportionately to
incumbents as evidence that a sense of obligation rather than a robust set
of policy preferences motivates many donors.145 Few with business
pending before Congress care to risk the ire of a sitting legislator by
supporting his or her challenger. For example, in the 2012 elections the
defense industry spent ninety-four percent of its funds supporting the
incumbent and just one percent supporting a challenger; the finance and
insurance industry spent eighty-nine percent of its funds supporting an
incumbent and just two percent supporting a challenger (the remaining
percentages went to open seats).146 The evidence is even starker if one
looks at how campaign contributions shift as committee membership
changes. A recent Stanford study found that legislators who lose their
places on influential committees “experience a sharp drop in
contributions from PACs overseen by their committee.”147 For example,
sudden removal from the House Ways and Means Committee resulted in
a $326,060 drop in PAC contributions.148
Of course, any individual transaction underlying these statistics may
be explained through the traditional narrative. Perhaps they merely show
donors expressing their preference for a policy rather than a party, or
donors truly preferring the sitting official over her challenger. They may
144. Id.
145. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 2–3; Incumbent Advantage, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/incumbs.php?cycle=2014&type=A&party=A (last visited
July 21, 2015) (reporting that in 2014 House incumbents raised six times as much as their
challengers and Senate incumbents raised ten times as much as their challengers); see also MICHAEL
JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER, AND DEMOCRACY 70–71 (2005)
(postulating that donors may be skeptical of the donor-legislator relationship but will contribute to
incumbent campaigns not because they are concerned about “favorable policy,” but because they
feel obligated, even extorted, by legislative leaders); James M. Snyder, Jr. Campaign Contributions
as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980–1986, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1195, 1197
(1990) (arguing that incumbents have more favors to sell because of their historical political
influence in Washington, so they receive more in donations than do challengers).
146. PAC Dollars to Incumbents, Challengers, and Open Seat Candidates, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/pac2cands.php?cycle=2012 (last visited July 21, 2015).
147. Eleanor Neff Powell & Justin Grimmer, Money in Exile: Campaign Contributions and
Committee Access 25 (Oct. 26, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://stanford.edu/~jgrimmer/money.pdf; see also id. at 17 (“When legislators are exiled from
broadly influential committees, the largest decrease in contributions comes from PACs that
represent companies under the purview of the committee.”). This is all the more notable given that
committee exile generally is correlated with an increase in PAC contributions, presumably to
forestall the risk of perceived vulnerability at the ballot box. Id. at 15–17 (noting that the increase
appears to come from PACs with a partisan or electoral focus).
148. Id. at 18. The authors note by way of comparison that the average House race cost
approximately $1.2 million in 2012; these reductions are significant. Id.

12 - Mueller.docx (Do Not Delete)

1816

12/21/2015 8:08 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1783

even demonstrate nothing more than blatant access-seeking by
grasping—and very willing—special interests. Less easy to explain
away is feedback from wealthy donors themselves. A 2013 poll of 302
business leaders by the non-partisan Committee for Economic
Development found that seventy-five percent of respondents reported
that the U.S. campaign finance system is “pay-to-play,” and sixty-four
percent believe it is a serious problem.149 Eighty-nine percent of
respondents supported limitations on contributions to candidates and
political groups—a remarkable figure in light of McCutcheon’s vigorous
defense of individual donors’ expressive rights.150
Are these business leaders correct? It is difficult to imagine that so
many executives would believe the system is “pay-to-play” without
some indication that is true, but tracking this impact is difficult. Studies
looking for a correlation between legislator voting patterns and
contributions have been inconclusive, although as critics have noted, this
is a very blunt metric.151 Much—indeed most—legislative action occurs
out of the public spotlight before a vote ever occurs, and intangibles
such as the salience of an issue or the existence of potential (but not yet
actual) contributors may impact a vote.152 A 2014 study attempted to
149. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND
REFORM (2013) [hereinafter AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND REFORM],
available at https://www.ced.org/pdf/Campaign_Finance%2C_Hart_and_AmView.pdf (arguing that
the situation has worsened in the wake of Citizens United); see COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., AFTER
CITIZENS UNITED: IMPROVING ACCOUNTABILITY IN POLITICAL FINANCE, HIDDEN MONEY: THE
NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY IN POLITICAL FINANCE, PARTIAL JUSTICE: THE PERIL OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS (2015), available at https://www.ced.org/pdf/moneyinpoliticsexsum_4.pdf (“Current
fundraising practices promote a pay-to-play mentality that encourages political giving as a means of
influencing legislative decision-making. The demand for campaign money places pressure on those
who have particular interests in government policy to make contributions and spend money in
support of those seeking public office. Prospective donors, particularly members of the business
community, are encouraged to pursue influence through political giving, which poses the risk of
long-term national interests being sacrificed for short-term gains. Members of the business
community also face ‘shake downs’ for political contributions or feel compelled to match—or
exceed—the amount given by competing interests.”).
150. AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND REFORM, supra note 149.
151. See, e.g., Thomas L. Brunell, The Relationship Between Political Parties and Interest
Groups: Explaining Patterns of PAC Contributions to Candidates for Congress, 58 POL. RES. Q.
681, 681–88 (2005); Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Congressional Officials Grant Access
to Individuals Because They Have Contributed to Campaigns: A Randomized Field Study, 00 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 1, 1–3 (2015) (reviewing literature in this area).
152. See Powell & Grimmer, supra note 147, at 2–3; Chamon & Kaplan, supra note 131, at 1;
Karen H. Good, Keynote Address from Jack Abramoff: “Don’t Repeat Any of This. No, I’m
Kidding,” 3 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 345, 346–47 (2012) (giving examples of how promises of money
from lobbyists influenced policy discussions and agenda setting regarding legislation outside the
legislative chamber); see also Lynda W. Powell, The Influence of Campaign Contributions on
Legislative Policy, 11 FORUM 339, 342 (2013) (noting in the context of a state-based study that
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avoid some of these empirical pitfalls with an experiment. Researchers
had a political organization contact 191 congressional offices in an
attempt to arrange a meeting between someone in the congressional
office and a donor—but they only revealed the individual was a donor in
certain situations.153 The results were unambiguous: “[S]enior
policymakers attended the meetings considerably more frequently when
[c]ongressional offices were informed that the meeting attendees were
donors.”154 The likelihood of attendance increased, in fact, by three to
four times if the donor was revealed, a result that was “highly unlikely”
due to chance.155
Of course, it is not necessary that the unwilling donor be correct about
the nature of political contributions so much as believe himself to be so,
and thus feel pressured into making contributions in kind or in an
amount far larger than he would wish. The unwilling donor is often less
motivated by a desire for a particular legislative action than a fear about
what might happen if a contribution is not forthcoming. 156 For this
donor, a single powerful anecdote about a result achieved or lost may be
enough, in the prisoner’s dilemma-like matrix of risk analysis that
donors contemplate, to convince him that a contribution is required.157 In
“[w]hile donations can be used to aid the passage of legislation, they are more often given to kill a
bill quietly,” and quoting Tom Loftus, former Wisconsin state politician, as saying that donations
mainly “buy the status quo”).
153. Kalla & Broockman, supra note 151, at 1.
154. Id. at 9 (“Only 2.4% of offices arranged meetings with a member of Congress or chief of
staff when they believed the attendees were merely constituents, but 12.5% did so when the
attendees were revealed to be donors. In addition, 18.8% of the groups revealed to be donors met
with any senior staffer, while only 5.5% of the groups described as constituents gained access to a
senior staffer, a more than threefold increase.”).
155. Id. at 10.
156. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 125 n.13 (2003) (quoting the declaration of
Gerald Greenwald of United Airlines: “Business and labor leaders believe, based on their
experience, that disappointed Members, and their party colleagues, may shun or disfavor them
because they have not contributed. Equally, these leaders fear that if they refuse to contribute
(enough), competing interests who do contribute generously will have an advantage in gaining
access to and influencing key Congressional leaders on matters of importance to the company or
union”).
157. Cf. Graham Morehead, The Corporate Campaign Contribution Game, SCILOGS (Oct. 10,
2011), http://www.scilogs.com/a_mad_hemorrhage/the-corporate-campaign-contribution-game/ (“If
you are a large corporation, you have a choice: to exert or not exert influence on legislators. If you
don’t spend money on PACs you can spend it on R&D, or advertising, or employee incentives, or
anything that’s actually productive. The problem is, how can you trust your competitors to not
spend money on PACs? You can’t. You are in the prisoner’s dilemma. If neither of you spend
money on politics you both come out ahead. If only one spends money, the other one will suffer. It’s
a game that neither party can afford not to play. As long as it’s legal, all large companies are
compelled to play.”).
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his book denouncing his previous profession, former lobbyist Jack
Abramoff recalled an exchange that typifies the type of request an
unwilling donor might receive:
In 1995, when Microsoft needed access to the House
Republican Leadership, conservatives were there to help. When
the company started to feel the Clinton administration’s pressure
on the issue of software program encryption export, it was
Majority Whip Tom DeLay who came to the rescue. . . . DeLay
expressed his general support for their positions and reminded
them it was likely to be the Republicans who would defend the
freedom they required to develop their company. He made a soft
appeal for political contributions from the company . . . .
One of the Microsoft executives firmly brushed off his
solicitation, prompting DeLay to deliver a stern message. When
he was a freshman in Congress, he told them, he approached
Walmart for a campaign contribution. The government affairs
director of Walmart told him that Walmart didn’t like to “sully
their hands” with political involvement. Staring intently at the
Microsoft executives, DeLay continued: “A year later that
government affairs rep was in my office asking me to intervene
to get an exit built from the federal highway adjacent to a new
Walmart store. I told him I didn’t want to sully my hands with
such a task. You know what? They didn’t get their ramp. You
know what else? They will never get that ramp.”
DeLay smiled, without taking his eyes off the quivering
executives. As we would say in the lobbying business: They
finally got the joke. A $100,000 check was soon delivered to the
Republican Congressional Committee, and Microsoft’s
relationship with the American right commenced.158
Consider too that the ban on corporate political contributions (as
opposed to the ban on corporate independent expenditures, which was
struck down in Citizens United) remains in place in part because
virtually no corporation has challenged it.159 Relatedly, in the pitched
158. ABRAMOFF, supra note 124, at 64–65.
159. See 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012); R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41542, THE
STATE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 11–13
(2014). There have been a handful of challenges to BCRA’s corporate contribution ban by not-forprofit advocacy organizations, see, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003), but the only
challenges of note from for-profit entities have come in attempts to defend against criminal money
laundering charges, see, e.g., United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding
corporate contribution ban constitutional as applied to entity that reimbursed employees for
campaign contributions). Challenges by nonprofit organizations to city and state corporate
contribution bans have also been rare and largely unsuccessful. See, e.g., Catholic Leadership Coal.
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legal battle around the constitutionality of BCRA that resulted in
McConnell, “business parties,” including the Chamber of Commerce and
the National Association of Manufacturers, filed an action that was
joined to Senator McConnell’s challenge to the law.160 One of the most
hotly contested sections of BCRA banned “soft money,” or funds raised
by candidates and parties outside of federal limits to be used for
supposedly non-campaign, “party-building,” activities.161 Prior to
BCRA, corporations could not contribute directly to candidates, but they
frequently gave large amounts of soft money to the political parties.162 In
McConnell, the business parties argued strenuously for their right to run
independent “issue ads” discussing candidates by name up to the date of
the election (challenging the “electioneering communications” section of
the new law, the issue upon which they would prevail in Citizens
United).163 But they were utterly silent when it came to the soft money
ban.164 There is perhaps no better evidence of the unwilling donor than
the fact that the most politically active business organization in
Washington—the Chamber of Commerce—was unwilling to join the
fight for its right to give, and to be solicited for, direct contributions.165
C.

Historical Context

If one accepts that the unwilling donor exists, the next question one
might ask is why his interests have not been considered before in
campaign finance doctrine. There are two answers to this question. One
draws on historical accounts, and the other looks to more recent events.
The first answer is that campaign finance laws have in fact
of Tex. v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409, 443 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting challenge by a nonprofit
corporation to a state law prohibiting, inter alia, corporate campaign contributions); Iowa Right to
Life Comm. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1787
(2014) (same).
160. See generally McConnell, 540 U.S. 93; Brief of Appellants, “Business Plaintiffs,” Chamber
of Commerce of the U.S. et al., McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (No. 02-1756) [hereinafter McConnell
Business Plaintiffs’ Brief].
161. See 2 U.S.C § 431 (2012); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 94.
162. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122–32; see also supra note 75 (detailing soft money rise).
163. McConnell Business Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 160, at 11–44.
164. Compare McConnell Business Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 160, with Reply Brief of
Appellant, Mitch McConnell, McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (No. 02-1756).
165. See David Steinbach, Million Dollar Baby: U.S. Chamber Is First to Hit Lobbying
Milestone, OPENSECRETS.ORG (July 23, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/07/billiondollar-baby-us-chamber-is-first-to-hit-lobbying-milestone/;
Lobbying,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=s (last visited Dec. 10, 2015) (presenting
research that from 1998 to 2015, the Chamber of Commerce outspent the next highest spender on
lobbying (the American Medical Association) $1,160,065,680 to $326,122,500).
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accommodated concerns about the unwilling donor in the past. Indeed,
these concerns were present at the genesis of modern campaign finance
regulation, the 1907 Tillman Act.166 As Robert Sitkoff has outlined in
detail, the 1907 Act, which prohibited corporations from making direct
political contributions (a ban that still stands), followed a decade in
which the “national political parties for the first time deployed
sophisticated and systematic procedures for demanding contributions for
their candidates from corporations in particular.”167 It was not necessary
for these “demands,” which many business leaders viewed as outright
extortion, to link directly to a specific political act; these were payments
not akin to bribery so much as to protection money.168 Newspapers at the
time reported that Wall Street firms were advised what level of
contribution was expected from them, an amount that was directly
pegged to the firm’s profitability.169 If payment was not made in the
form of campaign contributions, there were implied consequences.170
Sitkoff points to contemporary evidence to support his contention that
early campaign finance reform efforts were motivated not just by fear
that private interests were seeking to corrupt the public process, but by
concerns that federal candidates and the national parties were overreaching.171 If corporations (or their executives) today are silent when it
comes to asserting their First Amendment right to contribute, they were
166. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). Concerns about the potential of the federal
government to wield overly coercive power date back to America’s foundation. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison); see also ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 32–
80 (2014) (arguing that concerns about preventing systemic government corruption and undue
influence informed the Founding Fathers and underlie the Constitution).
167. Sitkoff, supra note 31, at 1132.
168. See id. at 1136; Hasen, supra note 31, at 204–07.
169. Sitkoff, supra note 31, at 1132.
170. Sitkoff quotes from a contemporaneous New York Times article about how an executive
might have viewed a visit from the head of the Republican National Committee (and former
Secretary of Commerce and Labor) George Cortelyou, particularly if the executive worked in a
business, such as banking or insurance, that fell under the oversight of Commerce:
Chairman Cortelyou goes to one of the officers of a large corporation and informs him that the
Republican National Committee expects a substantial contribution from his company. The
officer in question is surprised; he is not of Mr. Roosevelt’s party, neither he nor his
corporation has been accustomed to meddle with politics; he asks for time to think it over. In
the solitude of his office his thoughts run in this wise: I do not want to give money to the
Republican National Committee. But I am trustee of the interests of the stockholders of this
corporation. I may soon have to appear before this man as a representative of my corporation in
a matter affecting its business, as to which he will have, if not official discretion, at least very
great personal and official influence, which I would dislike to have used against me. I cannot
let my personal disinclinations stand in the way of the company’s interests. I will make this
forced contribution to Mr. Cortelyou’s fund.
Id. at 1134 (quoting To Bar Corporation Cash in Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1907, at 1).
171. Id. at 1131–39.
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jubilant following the passage of the Tillman Act. Even though the Act
quite obviously burdened corporate speech, it received enthusiastic
support from the very community whose “rights” it was impeding.
“Indeed,” Sitkoff notes, “consider this reaction of a ‘great financial
authority’ to the Senate’s passage of the statute, which was reported in a
[New York Times] editorial entitled Happy Corporations: ‘[We] welcome
[] this legislation with very much the same emotions with which a serf
would his liberation from a tyrannous autocrat.’”172 Similarly coercive
behavior preceded and helped precipitate the 1939 Hatch Act, which
prohibits federal contractors from making contributions for any political
purpose,173 and it is possible that similar concerns emerged prior to the
1947 Taft-Hartley Act’s174 ban on direct union contributions.175
A more current answer to the question of why the interests of the
unwilling donor do not appear in modern campaign finance
jurisprudence—and, perhaps, why legal scholarship has scarcely
addressed the subject176—requires a brief review of how advocacy has

172. Id. at 1136 (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted); cf. Richard Epstein,
Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right That Big Corporations Should Have but Do Not
Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 653–54 (2011) (arguing that the right of corporations to
donate directly to candidate’s campaign remains a reform no executive wants).
173. The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1508 (2012). The ban was recently challenged and upheld
in federal court. See Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed sub
nom. Miller v. FEC, No. 15-428, 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3550 (Oct. 2, 2014); Oral
Argument, Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013), available at http://www.cspan.org/video/?321777-1/wagner-v-fec-oral-argument. The government’s brief in Wagner
describes this history:
[A]buses [in the 1936 and 1938 elections] included requiring “destitute women on sewing
projects . . . to disgorge” part of their wages as political tribute or be fired, and requiring WPA
workers to make political contributions by depositing $3-$5 from their $30 monthly pay under
the Democratic donkey paperweight on the supervisor’s desk. Of particular prominence in
congressional debates regarding the Hatch Act was the Democratic “campaign-book racket,” in
which a government contractor was required to buy campaign books—“the number varying in
proportion to the amount of Government business he had enjoyed”—at exorbitant prices in
order to assure future opportunities for government business. The scheme also coerced
government contractors to buy advertising space: “[I]t was either take the space or be
blacklisted.”
Brief of Appellee at 8, Wagner, 717 F.3d 1007 (No. 13-5162) (citations to record omitted).
174. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2012)).
175. See Joseph E. Kallenbach, The Taft-Hartley Act and Union Political Contributions and
Expenditures, 33 MINN. L. REV. 1, 20 (1948) (noting that union leaders had expressed far less
concern about the Act’s ban on direct contributions than its ban on independent expenditures).
176. In addition to the events described in this section, another likely reason for the lack of
scholarship in this area is because until Citizens United and now McCutcheon, the compelling
government interests against which one evaluated campaign finance legislation extended past quid
pro quo bribery to examples of access and influence that accommodated, albeit tacitly, the unwilling
donor’s interests. See supra notes 68–79 and accompanying text.
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changed in Washington, D.C. since FECA was enacted. The Court’s
jurisprudence in this area has not kept up with the times. In the decades
since Buckley laid out the paradigm of the rent-seeking contributor,
Washington has witnessed several trends that have elevated the roles of
both the elected official and campaign contributions.
The first trend is a dramatic increase in federal lobbying. Lee
Drutman reports that “[i]n 2009, politically active organizations reported
$3.47 billion on direct lobbying expenses, up from $1.44 billion reported
just ten years prior, and, controlling for inflation, almost seven times the
estimated $200 million in lobbying expenses in 1983.”177 Drutman
estimates that the actual amount spent on lobbying is at least twice what
is reported, while some experts put the figure as high as $9 billion in
2013.178 The dramatic rise in earnings for lobbyists reflects an equally
dramatic increase in the number of corporations seeking their services
and opening their own government relations departments in
Washington.179 There are any number of theories for why lobbying has
increased so dramatically over the last several decades, from the
protective—a concern that a particular government regulation could
impact one’s business—to the proactive—a savvy investment in
securing a tax extender, earmark, or other government favor180—but for
present purposes, the salient fact is the increased engagement of
Washington by corporate America and other special interests.181
The second trend is the professionalization of the lobbying industry.
As Larry Lessig notes in Republic, Lost, whereas once lobbyists may
177. Lee Drutman, The Business of America Is Lobbying: Explaining the Growth of Corporate
Political Activity in Washington, DC 1 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
California,
Berkeley),
available
at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=
10.1.1.519.3212&rep=rep1&type=pdf; see also Robert G. Kaiser, The Power Player; How the Rise
of One Lobbying Firm Helped Transform the Way Washington Works, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2007,
at A1 (reporting that “in 1975, the total revenue of Washington lobbyists was less than $100 million
a year. In 2006 the fees paid to registered lobbyists surpassed $2.5 billion”).
178. Lee Fang, Where Have All the Lobbyists Gone?, THE NATION (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://www.thenation.com/article/178460/shadow-lobbying-complex#; see also LEE DRUTMAN, THE
BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME POLITICIZED AND POLITICS
BECAME MORE CORPORATE 9 (2015) (citing Tim LaPira, How Much Lobbying Is There in
Washington? It’s Double What You Think, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Nov. 25, 2013, 1:27 PM),
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/11/25/how-much-lobbying-is-there-in-washington-itsdouble-what-you-think/).
179. Drutman, supra note 177, at 31.
180. One University of Kansas study found that the return on investment for firms lobbying for
the tax holiday on repatriated earnings created by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 was
more than $220 for every $1 spent—a 22,000 percent return. Alexander, Mazza & Scholz, supra
note 131.
181. See Drutman, supra note 177, at 1.
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have sought results through techniques best described as “grotesque”—
think paper bags of money and even more unsavory bribes—today’s
lobbyists are, with perhaps a few exceptions, well-educated professional
policy “wonks,” often with years of subject matter expertise.182 In the
last 150 years, lobbying has gone from being an arrangement
presumptively void on public policy grounds to a profession with a
constitutional pedigree.183
This rise in size and stature by those seeking to influence government
action has changed the norms in Washington. It has eroded the tacit
barrier that existed between lobbyists and elected officials. A 2007
article in The Washington Post observed that while “[i]n 1975 the rare
hiring of a former member of Congress as a lobbyist made eyebrows
rise[,] [t]oday 200 former members of the House and Senate are
registered lobbyists.”184 In 2015 that number is 427.185 Similarly, in the
1980s and 90s, older federal lawmakers “balked” at the idea of soliciting
funds from an industry that they regulated.186 Today, it is business as
usual.187 As the culture of money and influence became more regulated
and conventional, it became more systemic and accepted.
Lee Drutman tries to understand the “puzzle” of why business
political activity continued to increase in Washington in the 1980s and
1990s even as the immediate threat to business interests (e.g., taxes,
182. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS AND A PLAN TO
STOP IT 101–04 (2011); see Fang, supra note 178.
183. Compare Zephyr Teachout, The Forgotten Law of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 4, 7–12
(2014) (challenging the modern view that the First Amendment was intended to protect lobbying
activities and quoting Marshall v. Baltimore Ohio Railroad Co., 57 U.S. 314 (1853), Tool Co. v.
Norris, 69 U.S. 45, 56 (1864), and Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441 (1874), early Supreme Court cases in
which the Court held lobbying contracts void on public policy grounds), with Nicholas W. Allard,
Lobbying Is an Honorable Profession: The Right to Petition and the Competition to Be Right, 19
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 40 (2008) (reviewing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on lobbying,
and arguing that more recently the Court took a “notable step” to recognize a constitutional right to
engage in the lobbying profession).
184. Kaiser, supra note 177.
185. Former
Members,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/
top.php?display=Z (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).
186. LESSIG, supra note 182, at 99–100 (relating, inter alia, a 1982 conversation in which Senator
John Stennis, then chairman of the Armed Services Committee, “was asked by a colleague to hold a
fund-raiser at which defense contractors would be present[.] Stennis balked. Said Stennis: ‘Would
that be proper? I hold life and death over these companies. I don’t think it would be proper for me to
take money from them’”); see also TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 128, at 91 (quoting former Rep.
Dan Boren as making a similar observation).
187. See Keenan Steiner & Anupama Narayanswamy, OCE Report on Financial Reform Shows
Nexus Between Fundraising and Legislating, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Feb. 7, 2011, 2:41 PM),
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2011/02/07/oce-report/ (noting occasions where lawmakers
attended fundraisers within hours of voting on bills relevant to attendees).
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regulations) diminished. He posits that “the growth of corporate
lobbying is a result of a path-dependent learning process” in which
lobbyists discovered opportunities for companies in the federal
government and corporate managers over time grew more comfortable
with lobbying.188 Following the approach that Professor McChesney
took in understanding regulatory theory,189 I would add a gloss to this
narrative, widening the frame on the cycle of dependence to include the
political figures who benefited over the years from increased campaign
contributions and in time came to rely upon them. There is significant
evidence that money raised by candidates has become necessary both to
maintain their position in a fundraising “arms race” against challengers
and to maintain their lifestyles.190
188. Drutman, supra note 177, at 2; see also Kaiser, supra note 177 (charting the exploitation of
the earmarking process through the 1980s and 1990s).
189. MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 46–50.
190. Although the McCutcheon plurality appeared to assume that campaign contributions all go
toward expressive advocacy and electoral expenses, this is far from reality. While political
contributions cannot be spent to buy, for example, a house or car for personal use, expenses such as
a new wardrobe, trips to exclusive resorts, and dinners at the nicest restaurants in town can all be
written off as campaigning or fundraising expenses or reimbursed from a leadership PAC. Marcus
Stern & Jennifer LaFleur, Leadership PACs: Let the Good Times Roll, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 26,
2009, 10:32 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/leadership-pacs-let-the-good-times-roll-925.
The use of Leadership PAC funds, which are subject to less stringent restrictions than candidates’
campaign accounts, is particularly revealing. See Steve Kroft, Washington’s Open Secret: Profitable
PACs, CBS NEWS (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/washingtons-open-secretprofitable-pacs/. While some excessive expenditures do attract censure, as in the case of former
Congressman Aaron Schock, who had his congressional office decorated in the style of the
aristocratic British drama “Downton Abbey,” or Senator Robert Menendez, who accepted lavish
gifts and trips from a donor, these cases are perhaps most notable in the underlying culture they
reveal. See Jake Sherman et al., Schock Resigns, POLITICO (Mar. 17, 2015, 2:08 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/aaron-schock-resigns-116153.html; Matt Apuzzo, U.S.
Charges Menendez Sold Political Favors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2015, at A1. Consider, for example,
former House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, who lost his primary in an upset in 2014. As
incredulous media outlets noted, Cantor’s campaign spent more on dinners at steakhouses than his
opponent, David Brat, spent on the entirety of his campaign. Joan E. Greve & Jack Linshi, Cantor
Spent More on Steakhouses than the Guy Who Beat Him Spent on His Whole Campaign, TIME (June
11, 2014), http://time.com/2857694/eric-cantor-dave-brat-spending/. A breakdown of the
campaign’s spending showed that the steakhouse dinners also topped the amount the campaign
committee spent on “strategy and research,” and yet they were only a small percentage of the
considerable “fundraising” costs the campaign expensed. Id. Eric Cantor also had a Leadership
PAC, the Every Republican Is Crucial PAC, which could accept donations higher than those that
could go directly to his campaign and was meant to allow him to support other like-minded
candidates. In the 2012 election cycle, Cantor’s Leadership PAC raised $5,506,748 and spent
$5,373,750, yet only donated $2,086,000 to other candidates. Every Republican Is Crucial PAC,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.php?strID=C00384701&cycle
=2012 (last visited July 21, 2015). Campaign and PAC funds can also be used to hire outside
consultants, which not infrequently include family members. Kroft, supra (statement of Melanie
Sloan, noting that there are at least seventy-five Members of Congress who employ family members
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Indeed, two of the most recent anti-corruption initiatives on Capitol
Hill have served to further enhance the position of elected officials and
the centrality of campaign contributions. The first is the passage of the
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA),191
which instituted systemic and ambitious lobbying reforms in the wake of
the Jack Abramoff scandal.192 Until HLOGA, lobbyists were subject to
strict disclosure requirements, but lobbying was otherwise largely
unrestricted, constrained only by internal House and Senate ethics
guidelines and criminal bribery and gift statutes.193 Offers of gifts and
trips to politicians from those seeking political favor were common. 194
HLOGA was meant to end the culture of graft, with an outright ban on
gifts195—including, for the most part, meals196—from registered
lobbyists, and a $100 annual limit on gifts from other sources.197 Most
within their campaigns). In extreme instances, certain Members have even loaned money to their
campaigns at a high rate of interest and have collected money annually from their campaign. Id.
(reporting at least fifteen cases of Members loaning themselves money from their campaign funds;
the most severe being Congresswoman Grace Napolitano, who loaned her campaign $150,000, and,
with eighteen percent interest, collected $228,000 twelve years later).
191. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012)).
192. 2 U.S.C. § 1601. Jack Abramoff was convicted of multiple violations of bribery, extortion,
and lobbying laws, most notably for charging an extra $85 million in lobbying fees to a casino for
his personal gain and giving large amounts of money and gifts to Members of Congress in direct
exchange for legislative action. See ABRAMOFF, supra note 124.
193. JACOB R. STRAUSS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40245, LOBBYING REGISTRATION AND
DISCLOSURE: BEFORE AND AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE HONEST LEADERSHIP AND OPEN
GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2007, at 3–5 (2011).
194. See Good, supra note 152, at 354–55. Abramoff, now a government reform advocate, has
estimated that ninety-nine percent of the activities in which he engaged while a lobbyist were legal.
Emily Tess Katz, Jack Abramoff: Supreme Court Justices ‘Just Don’t Get’ How Money Influences
Politics, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 18, 2014, 1:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/04/17/jack-abramoff-supreme-court-campaign-finance_n_5169510.html.
195. 2 U.S.C. § 1613(a); see also STRAUSS, supra note 193.
196. 2 U.S.C. § 1613(a); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 110TH
CONG., HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 27–28 (Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL]
(noting that, prior to HLOGA and other legislation, food and drink were excluded from the Gift
Rule); S. COMM. ON ETHICS, THE SENATE CODE OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT 3 (2008) [hereinafter
SENATE CODE OF CONDUCT], available at http://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/
serve?File_id=efa7bf74-4a50-46a5-bb6f-b8d26b9755bf (defining meals as “gifts” within the
meaning of HLOGA).
197. 2 U.S.C. § 1613(a). No single gift can exceed fifty dollars. KAREN L. HAAS, 114TH CONG.,
RULES
OF
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
42
(2015),
available
at
http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf (allowing the acceptance of small gifts by
members of the House of Representatives); SENATE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 196 (allowing
the acceptance of small gifts by Senators). These rules are subject to a number of exceptions for, for
example, personal friendship. Gifts Given on the Basis of Personal Friendship, HOUSE ETHICS
MANUAL, supra note 196, 41–42; id. at 40 n.98 (restricting gifts from friends, spouses, or other
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crucially, the only money that is now acceptable at all from registered
lobbyists, and that may be given over the strict cap from other sources, is
campaign contributions.198 The relationship between lobbying and
campaign contributions has thus been formalized and sanctioned. The
result has been to move elected officials into the driver’s seat and to
amplify the role of campaign contributions for those whose interests may
fall under the purview of Congress. Whereas once those seeking
government assistance may have offered to take a lawmaker to dinner or
to a ballgame, now it is the lawmaker who does the asking, inviting big
spenders to fundraisers at the venue of her choice and asking for
perfectly legal contributions to her campaign, PAC, leadership PAC, and
party committee—all of which help an elected official gain or maintain
his or her status within the party.199
Second, following the 2010 election, House Members acted to
eliminate earmarks from spending bills.200 Some of these earmarks, such
as the infamous “Bridge to Nowhere,” deserved censure as examples of
government waste and undue influence by special interests.201 For all
their faults, however, earmarks greased the legislative wheels.202 In their
connections only if they are given in the capacity of the Member’s work in Congress).
198. 2 U.S.C. § 1613; see Robert Pear, Ethics Law Isn’t Without Its Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/washington/20lobby.html?pagewanted=all (“‘If we
call it a campaign contribution, that makes it legal,’ Mr. Breaux said. ‘I can’t buy a $20 breakfast
for a senator whom I’ve known for years, but I can give him a $1,000 campaign contribution.’”
(quoting former Senator John B. Breaux)); see also TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 128, at 91
(suggesting that the “personal discomfort Members feel with asking others—that is, constituents
who are not lobbyists—[for campaign contributions] might actually make them more likely to stick
with fundraising from lobbyists”).
199. See Shane Goldmacher, Why Nearly Everyone in Congress Has a Leadership PAC These
Days, THE WIRE (July 22, 2013), http://www.thewire.com/politics/2013/07/why-nearly-everyonecongress-has-leadership-pac-these-days/67450/; see also Newmyer, supra note 21 (describing
Senator McConnell’s fundraising strategy: “They invited Republican lobbyists to dinner with
McConnell in a private room at Carmine’s, a family-style Italian restaurant in downtown
Washington, with no apparent price of admission. But after spaghetti and meatballs, McConnell
thanked everyone for coming, told them he needed them to contribute the maximum allowable in
personal money ($30,800 in 2012) to the National Republican Senatorial Committee, and then sat
back and waited. What followed was a long, pained silence, one of McConnell’s preferred
negotiating tools. Then, one after another, attendees acquiesced. Organizers called these ‘the
sandbag dinners’”); SCHWEIZER, supra note 27, at 151 (2013) (telling a similar anecdote of Harry
Reid’s fundraisers at a D.C. steakhouse).
200. See Earmark Elimination Act of 2011, H.R. 3707, 112th Cong. (2011).
201. Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2011, H.R. 662, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Gus
Lubin, 25 Scandalous Examples of Government Pork That Will Drive You Crazy, BUS. INSIDER
(Apr. 14, 2010, 2:25 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-worst-pork-of-2010-2010-4?op=1.
202. See Steven C. LaTourette, The Congressional Earmark Ban: The Real Bridge to Nowhere,
ROLL
CALL
(July
30,
2014,
2:59
PM),
http://www.rollcall.com/news/
the_congressional_earmark_ban_the_real_bridge_to_nowhere_commentary-235380-1.html
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absence, legislators’ ability to negotiate with each other has been
curtailed.203 Elected officials can no longer swap support for pet projects
meant to benefit their constituents. Instead, much of the leverage
Members now have to swing votes their way comes in their ability to
direct political money to their colleagues in the form of a contribution
from candidate or leadership PACs—the conferral of a private benefit
(both in increased electoral competiveness and lifestyle enhancements)
that elevates, again, the role of the leadership and of campaign
contributions.204
It may well be that today’s unwilling donor is the heir apparent to
yesterday’s quite complicit donor, finding himself, like the Sorcerer’s
Apprentice, the victim of a situation of his own making. 205 But campaign
finance doctrine is a constitutional, not karmic, inquiry. The discussion
below considers how to best address the reality of the unwilling donor.
III. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS
Now that we have identified the problem of the unwilling donor, what
can be done to address it? The options quickly narrow to the campaign
finance system itself. An individual unwilling donor is unlikely to find a
workable remedy in existing criminal or constitutional law. Campaign
finance legislation, however, was designed to address not only acts of
individual malfeasance, but also—indeed, primarily—issues of systemic
coercion; it is quintessential structural reform. In that framework, the
interests of the donor who does not wish to donate, or who wishes to
donate only a moderate amount, must be considered.
This Part briefly examines and rejects options for the unwilling donor
(“Whether the Pollyanna opponents of the earmark process want to admit it or not, the truth is that
earmarks were an incredibly important tool in the legislative bargaining process.”).
203. Burgess Everett, Harry Reid Embraces Earmarks, POLITICO (May 6, 2014, 3:54 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/harry-reid-earmarks-106406.html (explaining how the
earmark ban makes it more difficult for senior Members to persuade Members on the fence because
they can no longer offer earmark spending for individual districts as an incentive).
204. See supra note 127. It appears that many members of Congress also leverage leadership
PAC money into campaign cash by trading contributions with other candidates. See Viveca Novak
& John Sugden, Straw into Gold: Candidates Trading Leadership PAC Dollars for Campaign
Cash, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/10/straw-intogold-candidates-trading-leadership-pac-dollars-for-campaign-cash/; Eleanor Neff Powell, Dollars to
Votes:
The
Influence
of
Fundraising
in
Congress,
(Aug.
19
2012),
http://www.eleanorneffpowell.com/uploads/8/3/9/3/8393347/powell_-_apsa_2012.pdf (finding “[a]
strong relationship between fundraising assistance and subsequent legislative voting behavior”).
205. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, DER ZAUBERLEHRLING [THE SORCERER’S APPRENTICE]
(Edwin Zeydel trans. 1955) (1779), available at http://germanstories.vcu.edu/goethe/
zauber_e3.html.
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to assert his interests from outside the campaign finance framework,
arriving at the conclusion that his rights are best vindicated through
campaign finance laws. It then considers how recognizing the unwilling
donor might alter existing campaign finance doctrine and suggests how
this might have affected the approach the plurality took in McCutcheon
had it been raised in that case.
A.

Affirming the Continued Need for Campaign Finance Restrictions

The unwilling donor problem provides a response to intimations from
certain Justices and commentators that campaign finance laws are no
more than redundant legal gloss on top of existing prohibitions and
protections against corrupt activities.206 Upon considering what remedy
the law might offer an unwilling donor, one discovers that outside the
framework of campaign finance laws and regulations, the options are
scant and improbable. This is in part due to the Supreme Court’s narrow
view of extortion in the campaign finance context and to legal and
practical challenges in converting an unwilling donor’s interest in nonexpression into a cause of action. More fundamentally, however, it is
due to the forces that create the pressure that impels the unwilling donor,
which individual lawsuits cannot address.
We can start with contemplating what may appear the most logical
cause of action an unwilling donor might bring or seek to initiate: a
lawsuit or prosecution for extortion under existing anti-corruption
laws.207 If an unwilling donor is using campaign contributions to pay
something akin to “protection money” to a candidate, the argument runs,
he should have recourse through laws designed to protect against
shakedowns.208

206. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 269–71 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Hasen, supra note 24; see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct.
1434, 1462 (2014) (plurality opinion) (describing campaign finance restrictions as taking a
“prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach”).
207. In addition to the federal Hobbs Act, infra note 210, every state has a law criminalizing
extortion. See Penalties for Violations of State Ethics and Public Corruption Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF
ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chart-criminalpenalties-for-public-corr.aspx. In some states, extortion by a public official may be pled as a civil
action tort, but only if there is proof of damages, a difficult hurdle given that campaign
contributions can easily be refunded. Compare Bass v. Morgan, 516 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987), with Fuhrman v. Cal. Satellite Sys., 231 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Ct. App. 1986).
Notwithstanding the different burdens of proof between civil and criminal extortion cases, the
distinction between these types of actions is unlikely to be relevant to the unwilling donor for
reasons discussed in this section, and this Article does not dwell on it.
208. See SCHWEIZER, supra note 27, at 18–20.
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There are a number of obstacles to such an action, however. First, in
cases in which the money changing hands is a campaign contribution,
most courts will decline to convict in the absence of an explicit quid pro
quo.209 The Supreme Court read this requirement into the Hobbs Act,210
the federal extortion statute, in the 1991 case McCormick v. United
States.211 During his 1984 re-election campaign, Robert McCormick, a
West Virginian legislator, had a conversation with a lobbyist whose
clients he had previously helped and who hoped to have him sponsor a
bill in the 1985 legislative session.212 McCormick noted the high costs of
his campaign and observed that he had not yet “heard” from the
lobbyist’s clients.213 He received several cash payments afterwards from
both lobbyist and clients in the form of envelopes stuffed with $100
bills, none of which he reported, either as campaign contributions or
income for tax purposes.214 A jury convicted, and the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, applying a seven-factor test to determine that
the payments were not legitimate campaign contributions.215 In reversing
and remanding, the Supreme Court held that the solicitation of campaign
contributions could only violate the Hobbs Act if either “induced by the
use of force, violence or fear,” or “if the payments are made in return for
an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to
perform an official act.”216

209. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 992 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. McGregor,
879 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (M.D. Ala. 2012).
210. Hobbs Act, ch. 537, 60 Stat. 420 (1946) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012)).
211. Id.; McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). The Court read a similar requirement
into the federal illegal gratuities statute, under which courts did not formerly require a prosecutor to
prove a specific quid pro quo, in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398 (1999),
overturning the conviction of former Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)
(2012) (prohibiting, inter alia, asking for or giving a thing of value “for or because of any official
act performed or to be performed by” a public official); Valdes v. United States, 437 F.3d 1276
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding that only an act that falls within an officer’s official duties is covered by
the statute).
212. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 260.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. United States v. McCormick, 896 F.2d 61, 67 (4th Cir. 1990).
216. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 273. Because the jury had been instructed that “voluntary”
payments must be given with no expectation of benefit notwithstanding the fact that elected officials
regularly “act for the benefit of constituents or support legislation furthering the interests of some of
their constituents, shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited and received from
those beneficiaries,” the Court reversed. Id. at 272, 276. The dissenting Justices would have found
the jury instructions adequate and that the issue had not been properly preserved for appeal. See id.
at 287 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that jury instructions properly focused on the parties’ intent
at the time the contribution was made).
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A year later, in Evans v. United States,217 the Court clarified that an
“explicit” agreement to engage in a quid pro quo transaction need not be
spoken.218 In Justice Kennedy’s concurrence he explained that the quid
pro quo exchange need not be stated expressly, “for otherwise the law’s
effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods. The inducement
from the official is criminal if it is express or if it is implied from his
words and actions, so long as he intends it to be so and the payor so
interprets it.”219 Courts have struggled to reconcile these rulings, but
most have concluded that an extortion charge based on the provision of
campaign contributions cannot stand without a clear exchange for value;
that is, a quid pro quo.220
On the one hand, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Hobbs Act
prevents anti-corruption statutes from sweeping into their ambit the very
kind of constituent services a donor might legitimately expect from an
elected official, in effect penalizing the official for our system of
privately-financed elections.221 On the other hand, the Court’s position
significantly undermines any assertion that individual criminal statutes
offer adequate alternatives to the campaign finance system. This is
particularly clear from the vantage of the unwilling donor. If one
assumes that corruption looks something “akin to bribery” or rentseeking, then a quid pro quo requirement may make sense, or at least
comport with one’s understanding of the underlying crime.222 If one is
concerned with something akin to extortion or rent extraction, however,
the quid pro quo requirement read into the federal statutes by the
Supreme Court offers a superficially reassuring parallelism that lacks in
substance.223 Neither the Hobbs Act nor the vast majority of state
217. 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 274.
220. See Alschuler, supra note 96, at 461; Lauren Garcia, Note, Curbing Corruption or
Campaign Contributions? The Ambiguous Prosecution of “Implicit” Quid Pro Quos Under the
Federal Funds Bribery Statute, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 229, 237–39 (2012).
221. The Court may soon say more on this subject. As this Article was being prepared for
publication, attorneys for former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell, see infra note 237, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court asking, inter alia, whether “official action” under the
Hobbs Act is “limited to exercising actual governmental power, threatening to exercise such power,
or pressuring others to exercise such power, and whether the jury must be so instructed.” Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1 (2015) (No. 15A218).
222. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1466 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see
also Teachout, supra note 118, at 33 (noting that quid pro quo is not a requirement in a number of
bribery statutes).
223. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012); id. § 201(c); United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S.
398 (1999); Evans, 504 U.S. 255; McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
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extortion statues requires an actual exchange; the focus is on whether a
thing of value (i.e., a contribution) is obtained through coercion, threats,
abuse of one’s official position, or other improper means, not whether a
particular thing is actually provided or promised in return.224 More to the
point for the present inquiry, if the unwilling donor gives not to secure a
specific action but rather to forestall displeasure or avoid legislative
attention—to receive, in effect, nothing for something—anti-corruption
statutes that require a quid pro quo are of no recourse.
There are other, more practical, problems with a hypothetical
extortion action. It would, for example, be subject to prosecutorial
discretion.225 Prosecutors rarely bring such actions against federal
elected officials, likely because the prosecutions are time-consuming,
expensive, and difficult to win because of questions of intent, proof, and
motive.226 To take two recent examples, the high-profile investigations
of Senator Ted Stevens and Congressman Don Young resulted in
acquittal (Stevens) and the close of the investigation without charges
(Young).227 In addition, a conviction, even if achieved, is inadequate as a
224. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (“The term ‘extortion’ means the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color
of official right.”); see also Kristal S. Stippich, Behind the Words: Interpreting the Hobbs Act
Requirement of “Obtaining of Property from Another,” 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 295 (2003)
(arguing that to the extent extortion is a specific intent crime under the Hobbs Act, the relevant
inquiry should be on whether the extorter intended to obtain a thing of value unlawfully, not
whether the parties intended a specific exchange).
225. Cf. Craig Holman, The Tension Between Lobbying and Campaign Finance, 13 ELECTION
L.J. 45, 52 (2014) (“The congressional offices have referred to the U.S. Attorney’s office 11,906
instances of noncompliance with LDA reporting requirements. . . . Yet, Justice Department has
brought enforcement settlements in only a half-dozen cases in the nearly 18-year history of the
lobbying law. To date, only one court action to enforce LDA has ever been filed by the Justice
Department, a civil enforcement suit against Biassi Business Services Inc. in 2013 for chronic
violations of the law.” (citation omitted)).
226. Although the Department of Justice Public Integrity Unit charged slightly over 9000 Federal
officials between 2004 and 2013, few cases involved elected officials. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION
FOR 2013, at 20 (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin/docs/2013-AnnualReport.pdf. For example, in 2013, of the 315 convicted federal officials, Justice secured a
conviction in only one case involving an elected federal official (Congressman Richard G. Renzi), a
case that did not involve campaign contributions. Id.
227. See Paul Kaine, House Ethics Committee Fines Don Young, WASH. POST (June 20, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/06/20/house-ethics-committee-finesdon-young/ (noting despite a four year investigation by the FBI into inappropriate activity between
Young and energy companies, the only result was a fine by the Ethics Committee); Terry Frieden et
al., Lawyer Says Prosecutors’ Request Has ‘Cleared’ Stevens, CNN (Apr. 1, 2009, 9:18 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/01/stevens.case.dropped/index.html (explaining Stevens
was charged and convicted of receiving “hundreds of thousands of dollars of freebies” from
corporations, but the conviction was overturned because the prosecution withheld information
beneficial to the defense). Likewise, although former Congressman Michael Grimm was
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matter of public policy. Prosecutions happen long after the fact, and
even if corruption is proved, unwinding the damage is not a simple
matter; laws passed are not easily retracted, and money spent unlikely to
be returned.228
These objections demonstrate the unlikelihood of a prosecution
vindicating the interests of an unwilling donor, but there is another, more
fundamental reason that the availability of such actions provides an
inadequate remedy. An action for extortion in the campaign finance
context would re-frame an interest in having control over one’s
participation in the process of electing our public leaders—an interest of
constitutional proportion—as no more than a statutory violation by an
individual politician.229
Does this mean that the Constitution provides a cause of action for an
unwilling donor? The Supreme Court has recognized that the First
Amendment protects not only one’s right to speak, but also one’s right to
refuse to speak or to be coerced into speaking.230 For the purposes of this
discussion, I assume that a right to speak in a political campaign
encompasses a corresponding right not to speak.231 Certainly the
investigated for campaign finance irregularities, his guilty plea and sentencing in 2015 related to
one count of tax evasion in outside business dealings. See Stephanie Clifford, Former New York
Congressman Is Sentenced to 8 Months, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2015 at A15.
228. MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 21 (noting the “extralegal” nature of rent-seeking and other
exchanges between private individuals and legislators, leaving no conventional legal remedy for the
party being extorted).
229. Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (noting that in cases involving statutes
that regulate free expression, the “assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally
assure ample vindication of constitutional rights is unfounded”).
230. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (observing, in upholding the rights
of a couple wishing to cover the New Hampshire state motto on their license plate, “[a] system
which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee
the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts”); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209, 234–35 (1977) (observing, in denying the use of union dues for political activities unrelated to
collective bargaining, “[t]he fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather than prohibited
from making, contributions for political purposes works no less an infringement of their
constitutional rights. For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should
be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind
and his conscience rather than coerced by the State” (citations omitted)); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (observing, in overturning a requirement that students stay the
pledge of allegiance, “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are
any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us”).
231. One may distinguish the case of the unwilling donor from the cases set out above by noting
that his contribution is not required; it is (technically) a completely voluntary act. However, there is
significant evidence, as outlined above, that many political contributors do not feel that they can say
no and are giving (if they wished to give at all) far more than they would if they were giving just to
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willingness of the donor impacts the qualities we may impute to the
speech at issue and the attendant First Amendment protections.232 Even
if one assumed such a right exists, however, it is not clear that the
Constitution affords a remedy to an individual donor who feels obligated
to make donations he would rather not make.
Beyond the practical difficulties discussed above, an independent
First Amendment claim would face a number of challenges. To highlight
just some preliminary hurdles, courts are reluctant to recognize a private
right of action where Congress has not provided one, and the Supreme
express support for the candidate and her positions. The law has recognized the coercive potential of
a transaction in which one player has excessive market power and responded accordingly. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (1965) (finding terms of adhesion
contract unconscionable and unenforceable); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d
(1981) (“[G]ross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the
stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved elements of deception or
compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did
not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.”). But see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing contract of adhesion). See also Sherman Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012) (prohibiting anti-competitive business activities); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12–27 (same); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 527 U.S. 28 (2006) (tying arrangement
illegal under antitrust laws if plaintiff can show defendant had sufficient market power). It would be
difficult to imagine that where a constitutional right is at stake, courts would not similarly
acknowledge an individual interest in not being coerced into expressing, either in form or amount,
something that one does not wish to express, and/or a government interest in creating a system free
of such coercion. See O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 717 (1996)
(finding private contractor stated cause of action under § 1983 when it alleged it was fired for
refusing to contribute to mayor’s campaign: “[A]bsent some reasonably appropriate requirement,
government may not make public employment subject to the express condition of political beliefs or
prescribed expression”); Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291,
296 (2007) (“Our cases teach that there is a difference of constitutional dimension between rules
prohibiting appeals to the public at large . . . and rules prohibiting direct, personalized
communication in a coercive setting.” (internal citation omitted)).
232. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. While not framed as a free speech issue, it is
worth noting that the Supreme Court and an en banc panel of the D.C. Circuit have both cited a
concern that donors might feel coerced into giving in upholding, respectively, a bar rule prohibiting
judicial candidates from soliciting campaign contributions and a federal law barring federal
contractors from making any political contributions. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S.
__,135 S. Ct. 1656, 1669 (2015) (“The identity of the solicitor matters, as anyone who has
encountered a Girl Scout selling cookies outside a grocery store can attest. When the judicial
candidate himself asks for money, the stakes are higher for all involved. . . . The solicited individual
knows . . . that the solicitor might be in a position to singlehandedly make decisions of great weight:
The same person who signed the fundraising letter might one day sign the judgment. This dynamic
inevitably creates pressure for the recipient to comply, and it does so in a way that solicitation by a
third party does not. Just as inevitably, the personal involvement of the candidate in the solicitation
creates the public appearance that the candidate will remember who says yes, and who says no.”);
Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Miller v. FEC, No. 15428, 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3550 (Oct. 2, 2014) (citing the risk that a contractor would feel
coerced to make a contribution he would not otherwise make as a basis for upholding the contractor
ban).
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Court could well find that neither Section 1983 nor Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics233 and its
progeny provide the unwilling donor a remedy.234 Further, under either
theory an unwilling donor would have to demonstrate that a “state
action” has caused his constitutional deprivation and, further still, that
his claims are not barred by a defense of sovereign or qualified
immunity.235 These problems would not necessarily doom the action, but
they present significant obstacles.236
It is unlikely that these details would ever trouble the unwilling donor,
however, because there are far more substantial practical impediments to
reaching the point of considering individual action. After all, the sine
qua non of the unwilling donor is a reluctance to get on the wrong side
of an elected official. It is difficult to imagine that donor willing to bite
the hand that (potentially) feeds him, particularly in a competitive
environment where he understands himself to be bidding for a
politician’s favor or feels he cannot risk assuming otherwise. He is also
unlikely to willingly court the kind of scandal that often accompanies
public anti-corruption prosecutions by seeking help from the legal
233. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Bivens, 403 U.S. 388; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675
(2009) (assuming without deciding that a plaintiff could bring a First Amendment claim under
Bivens); O’Hare Truck Serv., 518 U.S. at 717–19 (allowing private government contractor to
maintain a First Amendment § 1983 action for retaliatory firing under political patronage scheme).
But see Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66–70 (2001) (noting Court’s reluctance
to extend Bivens, particularly where law provides alternative remedies); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367, 390 (1983) (declining to extend Bivens to First Amendment employee retaliation claim);
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (denying relief under § 1983 to private school
plaintiffs).
235. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 838 (“The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is
subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights ‘fairly attributable to the State?’” (citation
omitted)); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (government officials cannot be held vicariously liable under
Bivens for actions of their subordinates); Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998) (elected
officials have absolute immunity for legislative actions); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984)
(“Whether an official may prevail in his qualified immunity defense depends upon the ‘objective
reasonableness of [his] conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law.’” (citation
omitted)).
236. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 298–302 (holding that certain private actors may be
considered state actors for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a sufficiently close
nexus); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (same in the context of a private political primary);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 506 (1985) (arguing that
“limiting the Constitution’s protections of individual rights to state action is anachronistic, harmful
to the most important personal liberties, completely unnecessary, and even detrimental to the very
goals that it originally intended to accomplish”); cf. MCCHESNEY, supra note 30. Because my goal
here is to frame the problem and consider its possible implications on campaign finance
jurisprudence, I leave a more fulsome discussion of the First Amendment to a future piece.
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system.237 Those wealthy donors who have spoken out about feeling
“extorted” to make campaign contributions, such as John Hofmeister,
quoted in the introduction, are mostly former executives who no longer
feel the pressure to give in excess of or at odds with their true
preferences.238
Last, it is also difficult to imagine a federal elected official being so
brazen in her request to cross the line into outright extortion, particularly
as defined by the Supreme Court.239 As shown in the anecdote about
former Representative DeLay above, politicians and donors with any
degree of sophistication can have quite transactional discussions without
demonstrating the requisite level of intent or motive.240 While there have
been a few high-profile prosecutions under federal corruption laws over
the last few decades, most politicians are able to solicit campaign funds
within the boundaries of what the law allows; we have no way of
knowing how many (if any) of their requests are viewed as extortionate.
Consider too that both the federal anticorruption laws and campaign
finance legislation were written by legislatures to constrain legislators.
On the one hand, there is no one more familiar with the requirements
and temptations of campaign fundraising; on the other hand, there is the
risk of the fox guarding the henhouse.241

237. Consider, for example, the recent trial of former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell. See
United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’g 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va.
2014), petition for cert. filed, (Oct. 15, 2015) (No. 15-474) (holding there was sufficient evidence to
support jury’s determination that defendant had accepted gifts and loans in exchange for his use of
his official position); Dana Milbank, Opinion, Bob McDonnell Is a Loser Either Way, WASH. POST
(Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-bob-mcdonnell-is-a-losereither-way/2014/08/04/49cd64c6-1c2f-11e4-ae54-0cfe1f974f8a_story.html (observing that “[e]ven
if the disgraced former Virginia governor wins in court, he loses”). McDonnell’s conviction was
affirmed on appeal, but the Supreme Court subsequently stayed the decision, suggesting that it
might soon have more to say on issues discussed in this section. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, petition
for stay granted, 136 S. Ct. 23 (2015), and petition for cert. filed, (Oct. 15, 2015) (No. 15-474).
238. See Fitzpatrick & Griffin, supra note 26.
239. Cf. SCHWEIZER, supra note 27, at 173 (“[T]here shouldn’t be style points when it comes to
corruption.”).
240. See ABRAMOFF, supra note 124, at 64–65. If anything, the Abramoff prosecution
underscored this fact. His bribery and similar crimes were only discovered when Indian tribes
complained that their lobbyist was over-charging them. Good, supra note 152, at 354–55. Indeed,
when one considers recent corruption convictions, it is the indiscreetness of the culpable parties that
is most remarkable. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 182, at 106–07 (showing notes from former
Congressman Randy “Duke” Cunningham, who noted a price list for various bribes); SCHWEIZER,
supra note 27, at 171 (quoting disgraced Gov. Rod Blagojevich as saying of President Obama’s
vacant Senate seat, “you just don’t give it away for nothing”).
241. See supra note 10 (noting that in late 2014 Congress quietly raised the amount that national
party committees could solicit from less than $100,000 per cycle to more than $800,000); see also
MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 47 (“[A] period during which tax reform is formulated can be
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The discussion above demonstrates two things. First, the only place
the unwilling donor is likely to find relief from the perceived coercion of
the campaign finance system is within campaign finance laws
themselves. After all, the very purpose of these laws is to target and limit
improper political pressure—for example, the degree to which elected
officials might feel pressured by a donor to take a certain action,242 the
degree to which an employee may feel pressured by an employer to
contribute,243 and the degree to which a federal contracting officer may
feel pressured to award a contract.244 It is the proper arena in which to
safeguard the interests of a donor who might feel pressured by a
candidate or party official to contribute. Second, campaign finance must
be understood as a systemic framework of reforms that may borrow
from or overlap with individual anti-corruption laws but is not coterminal with them.
To expand on the second point: The pressure that the unwilling donor
feels—that he cannot say no without risking indirect or even direct
repercussions—comes only in part from an elected official or her staff. It
also comes from the knowledge that dozens or hundreds of other
donors—perhaps some also unwillingly—are contributing to the same
politicians (or to opposing politicians) in the hope that their issues will
be prioritized. In the case of legislation for which there are deeppocketed interests on both sides—a “double milker” bill in the
vernacular—the fundraising opportunities for elected officials are
significant.245 Where the issue is less salient, there is still sufficient
particularly profitable for members of the tax-writing committees. Not surprisingly, the most
influential members of those committees garner the most contributions . . . ‘the only reason it isn’t
considered bribery is that Congress gets to define bribery.’” (quoting former Rep. Andrew Jacobs,
Jr.)); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 2 (author unknown) (The McGraw Hill Companies, Inc.) (“In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself.”); TEACHOUT, supra note 166. While beyond the scope of this Article, I would note
that the risk of self-dealing does not resolve the question of whether Congress’s judgments in this
area should be more susceptible to judicial overrides. Cf. Rosen, supra note 99, at 1607–10 (arguing
that even if the Court is justified in ignoring Congress and “going it alone” in the campaign finance
area, it has failed to adequately make that case).
242. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
243. 11 C.F.R. § 114.2 (2014) (a corporation cannot use “coercion, such as the threat of a
detrimental job action, the threat of any other financial reprisal, or the threat of force, to urge any
individual to make a contribution or engage in fundraising activities on behalf of a candidate or
political committee”).
244. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
245. See SCHWEIZER, supra note 27, at 80–81 (“A milker bill gives politicians the opportunity to
‘milk,’ or squeeze, an industry for money. Whether the bill passes or not, the politicians still cash
in.”).
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evidence that large contributors receive beneficial outcomes to make an
informed donor believe that he must “pay to play.”246
Because the pressure does not come solely from the individual elected
official, a legal action against that official would only partially assuage
the fears that motivate the unwilling donor. His concerns are born out of
an understanding of the structural incentives embedded in campaign
finance laws. The only way to change these is through structural reform.
The next sections consider how the Court might incorporate the interests
of the unwilling donor in its campaign finance jurisprudence.
B.

Acknowledging the Unwilling Donor in Campaign Finance
Doctrine

Thus far, we have seen that the problem of the unwilling donor
complicates the Court’s emphasis on quid pro quo corruption and
underscores the need for a comprehensive system of campaign finance
regulation. There remains the question of how this flipped narrative
might impact the framework for judicial review of campaign finance
restrictions set out in Part I above. The unwilling donor has not yet made
an appearance in major campaign finance litigation.247 What would it
look like for the courts to acknowledge his interests? The goal of this
Article is not to present a definitive framework, but we can draw some
preliminary conclusions.
First, the problem of the unwilling donor complicates the elision of
money and speech that has dogged campaign finance discussions since
Buckley. There, the Court had reasoned that “because virtually every
means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the
expenditure of money,” a “restriction on the amount of money a person
or group can spend on political communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number
of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached.”248 This connection has been challenged in academic

246. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 29–32.
247. He has, however, played a bit part in two recent decisions of note. See Williams-Yulee v.
Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015); Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2015),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Miller v. FEC, No. 15-428, 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3550
(Oct. 2, 2014). The interests of the unwilling donor were not squarely addressed in either case,
however. In Williams-Yulee, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court treated his
potential existence as evidence that solicitation by judicial candidates raises the appearance of
impropriety. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1661. In Wagner, the D.C. Circuit treated it as a potential
threat to a merits-based contracting system. Wagner, 739 F.3d at 13.
248. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (footnote omitted).
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literature and even by some Justices in intervening decades, but it has
remained at the heart of modern campaign finance doctrine.249 Indeed, as
evidenced by shifts in the treatment of contributions between the
Buckley and McCutcheon Courts, the money-speech connection has only
grown stronger.250 The Court’s rationale is undermined, however, if the
speech that is purchased with campaign contributions does not capture
the true views of the donor or if it is not given with an electoral goal as
its primary purpose—if it is, in effect, less about speech than about
money.251
Second, the problem of the unwilling donor is about more than the
Government’s compelling interest in “corruption,” whether one is
talking about the Supreme Court’s current narrow definition or its
earlier, broader versions.252 A donor’s interest in not speaking and not
associating in political contests beyond what he actually believes cuts to
the constitutional core of campaign finance jurisprudence.253 It requires a
more critical examination of the First Amendment concerns raised by
campaign contributions.
Academics have long debated the underlying purpose of the
protections of the First Amendment, and the problem of the unwilling
donor implicates many of these.254 As evidenced by the discussion of
Buckley and McCutcheon above, there are at least two ways one might
frame the problem: as concern for protecting core political speech, or as

249. See, e.g., supra note 35; see also Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95
MINN. L. REV. 953 (2011); Jessica A. Levinson, The Original Sin of Campaign Finance Law: Why
Buckley v. Valeo Is Wrong, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 881 (2013); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the
Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
250. See supra notes 55–57, 100–02 and accompanying text (describing how the McCutcheon
plurality rejected Buckley’s conclusion that contribution caps restrict only certain forms of
expression and thus are valid).
251. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 96, at 425–26, 444 (arguing that “contributions and expenditures
affect two audiences [voters and candidates] in two different ways, one of them beneficial and
protected by the First Amendment and the other harmful and unprotected”).
252. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. The longtime acceptance of an expansive
definition of corruption may explain why the legal academics have thus far paid scant attention to
alternative frameworks.
253. See supra notes 230–36.
254. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948); POST, supra note 37; Thomas L. Ambro & Paul J. Safier, The First
Amendment, the Courts, and “Picking Winners,” 87 WASH. L. REV. 397 (2012); Robert H. Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1971); William J.
Brennan, III, Brennan on Brennan: The Justice’s Views on the Structural Role of the First
Amendment, 1994 N.J. LAW. 6 (1994); Hellman, supra note 249; Zephyr Teachout, Constitutional
Purpose and the Anti-Corruption Principle, 108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 200 (2014).
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a concern for protecting the speaker.255
First, if in fact the speech represented by the campaign contributions
is coerced or given unwillingly, one may fairly question what level of
constitutional protection it is due.256 Such contributions do not
accurately reflect the donor’s true feelings, so applying the First
Amendment to defend the speaker’s right to participate in “[d]iscussion
of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates” seems
misplaced.257 Nor do they provide the listener access to a reliable
“free . . . uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate about the same to
help her make an “informed choice” for advancement of “our
democracy.”258 Relatedly, if in fact money is being given or solicited not
to influence the outcome of an election, nor even to gain influence and
access for the donor, but instead with the intent to procure a legislative
result, it deserves no constitutional protection.259
It is uncertain whether these concerns about the nature of the speech
represented by unwilling contributions, even if validated, would be
enough to impact current campaign finance doctrine. Notwithstanding
the Court’s discussion of elevated status of political speech in Buckley
and subsequent rulings, in recent years it has rejected arguments
questioning the value of the speech protected by campaign finance laws,
although these arguments have been framed as concerns about

255. See supra notes 66–75 and accompanying text.
256. Cf. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 254; Bork, supra note 254 (opining that “[c]onstitutional
protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political”).
257. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977);
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (upholding anti-spam statute and noting
“the right of every person ‘to be let alone’ must be placed in the scales with the right of others to
communicate”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
258. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); see
also McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1480 (2014) (plurality opinion); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (noting that the Founders “valued
liberty both as an end and as a means . . . [and] believed that freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth”).
259. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441; Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1323, 1323–24 (2000) (observing that “core vote buying” is illegal across the United States and
evaluating normative rationales for this prohibition); Hellman, supra note 249, at 960–63
(comparing alienable and inalienable constitutional privileges); cf. Robert Peck, Jamin B. Raskin &
Burton D. Wechsler, Constitutional Implications of Campaign Finance Reform, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 161, 186 (1995) (“If spending money in politics is really speech, then the laws against bribery
should be unconstitutional. If what is being protected is my right to express myself by spending
money, I should have the right to buy a legislator’s vote or a citizen’s vote. . . . If someone
disagrees, that person can express views more eloquently by paying him more money than I am
offering. But if we say that the purchase of votes offends the core principle of democracy, then I
agree. But that is essentially the system we have now.” (quoting Professor Jamin Raskin)).
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corruption rather than speech.260 Thus, for example, the Court has
rejected the argument that evidence that political donors are motivated
by a desire for undue “access” and “influence,” rather than by a desire to
engage in political debate, demonstrates a sufficient risk of corruption or
appearance of corruption to warrant campaign finance restrictions.261
Under the framework proposed in this Article, however, evidence of
contributions given for “access” and “influence” is not merely evidence
of potential corruption or its appearance; rather, it demonstrates that the
nature of the speech itself is compromised, and validates the concerns of
the unwilling donor. Nevertheless, a reviewing court may find
arguments based in the quality of the speech at issue foreclosed by the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in this area.262
More difficult to reject under the Court’s current jurisprudence are
concerns not about the nature of the speech at issue but about the actual
intent of the speaker, that is, the autonomous interest of the donor in
remaining silent.263 When framed thus, two things become clear. First,
for reasons discussed above, these interests can only be addressed
through systemic reforms; the unwilling donor is less a political
enthusiast and more a risk-adverse strategist who will respond to the
logic of the system with which he is presented.264 Second, campaign
finance laws impact the rights of both the willing and the unwilling
donor, both of whom have a First Amendment interest in the decision of
whether, how much, and to whom to contribute. This Article argues that
campaign finance jurisprudence should accommodate the interests of
both types of donors.
There are different ways a court might thread this needle. Although
Buckley nowhere mentions the rights of non-association and nonexpression, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court’s suggestion there
that a donor’s First Amendment interests in contributing are largely

260. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1453 (acknowledging that some speakers may be giving
with “bad” intentions but finding that where the First Amendment is implicated the Court will not
scrutinize too closely).
261. See supra notes 69–85 and accompanying text.
262. But see Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (upholding a ban on
direct solicitation by state judicial candidates because, inter alia, some donors may feel coerced by
the request); Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed sub nom.
Miller v. FEC, No. 15-428, 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3550 (Oct. 2, 2014) (upholding a ban on
federal contractor contributions because, inter alia, some contractors may feel coerced to give).
263. Cf. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687 (2004)
(arguing that the structural provisions of the Constitution are often overlooked in favor of individual
rights); see also supra notes 230–36 and accompanying text.
264. See Chamon & Kaplan, supra note 131; Morehead, supra note 157.
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associative and symbolic resulted in an outcome that did achieve
something of a balance between the willing and unwilling donor. The
Buckley Court said that because a political contribution does not convey
a political argument beyond the expressive act of giving, Congress could
limit the amount of the donation but not the act itself.265 Thus, in the preMcCutcheon world the unwilling donor might feel coerced into giving
but could not be coerced into giving past a certain limit; the “arms race”
had known, and manageable, boundaries. This approach also
encapsulates the idea that as the amount of the contribution becomes
higher, the expressive/associative interests of the willing donor diminish
and the non-expressive/non-associative interests of the unwilling donor
increase.266 A tie initially goes to the expressive interests, but at a certain
point the non-expressive interests predominate.
One line of analysis courts might take now is to recognize the
interests of the unwilling donor as an additional “compelling”
government justification for campaign finance restrictions. Under this
approach, a court would ask both whether a restriction is justified
because of the risk of actual or apparent corruption, as it currently does,
and whether it is justified because of the risk that certain contributions
might be coerced from donors who would prefer to not express or
associate at the level to which they feel compelled. A right to speak is
diminished if it does not also include a realistic opportunity to not
speak.267
Alternatively, recognizing that the current campaign finance system
creates two categories of donors—willing and unwilling—suggests that
a more fundamental overhaul of the traditional analysis may be
warranted. A purposeful balancing of these interests would re-structure
the test that courts currently use to evaluate campaign contributions.268
265. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976). The McCutcheon Court rejected this approach.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449 (“To require one person to contribute at lower levels than others
because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on broader
participation in the democratic process.”).
266. In this regard, the unwilling donor problem provides additional arguments against the
Court’s increasingly “absolutist” approach to campaign finance restrictions. See, e.g., James A.
Gardner, Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the Implied
Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 673 (2011); Rosen, supra note 99. Whereas other
scholars’ critiques propose balancing the threat to individual First Amendment interests against
concerns such as “democratic ideals,” Gardner, supra, at 711, or “Republican Legitimacy,” Rosen,
supra note 99, at 1608, the approach outlined above highlights the individual constitutional interests
on both sides.
267. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
268. Although the McCutcheon plurality indicated that it reached its result without deciding
whether campaign contributions were subject to strict or “exacting” scrutiny, McCutcheon, 134 S.
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Through the lens of the unwilling donor, a donor’s positive First
Amendment expressive/associative interests become somewhat less than
the Court currently suggests, and the Government’s interest in
regulating—in setting rules of the game that protect both interests—
becomes greater. Thus, even if corruption or the appearance of
corruption, however defined, continues to be the touchstone for
determining whether regulation in an area is appropriate, the latitude
permitted the Government to address this compelling interest would be
greater.
It is worth pausing to consider independent expenditures—money not
subject to contribution limits and not raised by a candidate nor
coordinated in any way with her campaign—and to question the
soundness of an argument advocating for continued restrictions on
campaign contributions despite the vast amount that has been spent
independently on federal elections in recent years.269 Outside spending,
not including political parties’ expenditures, topped $1 billion in the
2012 cycle.270
Far from undermining the argument of this Article, the existence of a
robust independent expenditure system supports it. Provided that
independent expenditures are truly independent—a significant caveat in
the 2015–2016 cycle271—the problem of the unwilling donor should be
less acute in the independent expenditure area.272 As described above,
Ct. at 1437, its articulation of the test, particularly its focus on narrow tailoring, suggests that
scrutiny will be strict—or at least stricter—going forward. See supra note 91 and accompanying
text.
269. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010); 11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a) (2014)
(“The term independent expenditure means an expenditure by a person for a communication
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate that is not made in
cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a
candidate’s authorized committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.”).
270. Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php (last visited Oct.
9, 2015).
271. Already there has been circumvention of the prohibition on coordination between super
PACs and candidates. See, e.g., Russ Choma, DOJ Announces First Prosecution for Illegal
Coordination Between Candidate and Super PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Feb. 12, 2015),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2015/02/dojs-announces-first-prosecution-for-illegalcoordination-between-candidates-and-super-pacs/ (reporting on the recent conviction of a
Republican campaign staffer who coordinated funds between a super PAC and a candidate’s
campaign); see also Richard L. Hasen, Jeb the Destroyer, SLATE (Apr. 22, 2015, 3:01 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/04/jeb_bush_destroying_campaign_f
inance_rules_his_tactics_will_be_the_future.html (discussing how Jeb Bush and other presidential
candidates used a loophole in campaign finance rules to actively fundraise unlimited donations for
their SuperPACs prior to officially announcing their candidacy).
272. My argument here is that if politicians and parties are in fact walled off from the
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much of the pressure felt by donors is rooted in the solicitation by the
candidate, and a concern that the candidate might track their donations
against other contributors.273 In the past, some commentators have gone
so far as to suggest making campaign contributions anonymous, a
solution that poses several structural concerns and practical obstacles (a
donor could always, for instance, simply reveal himself), but has the
appeal of removing the potentially coercive nature of both the
solicitation and the contribution.274
Independent expenditures provide a similar degree of remove. Due to
their independent status, politicians cannot directly solicit them. 275
independent money system, but see infra note 274, the unwilling donor problem is significantly less
urgent. This is not to say, however, that independent expenditures do not also pose an extortive risk.
As Holman notes, independent expenditures are already being used as quite blatant bargaining chips
on the Hill. See Holman, supra note 225, at 60 (citing David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Get Potent
Weapon in Campaign Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/01/22/us/politics/22donate.html (quoting former FEC General Counsel Lawrence M. Noble
describing a request from a lobbyist: “We have got a million we can spend advertising for you or
against you—whichever one you want”). Notwithstanding the Court’s conclusion in Citizens United
that “independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption,”
558 U.S. at 357, this appears to be exactly the kind of quid pro quo behavior—perhaps not bribery,
but certainly extortion—that should concern the Court. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441
(describing quid pro quo corruption as exchanging acts for money). It may even be that an
awareness of such dynamics motivated the McCutcheon plurality to even the playing field by
allowing candidates and parties to solicit greater amounts in return. It is difficult to imagine how
such an “arms race” is good for business or the political process, much less in keeping with the
Founding Fathers’ vision, but that is another article. See generally TEACHOUT, supra note 166.
273. Based on the dissent in McCutcheon and the recently expanded contribution limits and
national party committee counts, a federal candidate can now ask a single donor for checks
exceeding $5.1 million to support colleagues and state and national parties. See McCutcheon, 134 S.
Ct. at 1473 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015,
Pub. L. No. 113-235, div. N, § 101, 128 Stat. 2130, 2772–73 (2014) (to be codified at 52 U.S.C.
§ 30116). As of yet, there is no single “joint fundraising committee” that could accept a single check
for $5.1 million, although joint fundraising committees have flourished since McCutcheon was
decided. Michael Beckel, ‘Jumbo Joints’: How Big Will the Newest Political Animals Get?, CENTER
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Apr. 22, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/
04/22/14612/jumbo-joints-how-big-will-newest-political-animals-get.
274. See Ian Ayres, Disclosure Versus Anonymity in Campaign Finance, in DESIGNING
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000). But see Richard Briffault,
Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 295–97 (2010) (arguing that anonymity
may have more detrimental consequences than benefits and that reform of the campaign
contribution disclosure system is a better alternative to replacing the system with anonymity).
275. 11 C.F.R. § 110.9 (2014); id. § 100.16. The unwilling donor problem could be implicated by
independent expenditures if the donor experiences direct pressure to give at a similar level.
Notwithstanding prohibitions to the contrary, there is mounting evidence that candidates are
sufficiently enmeshed with independent groups to make the risk of donor coercion a real concern.
See supra note 271. Indeed, the largest problem with independent expenditures is that their
independence is often in doubt. Stories abound of campaigns and independent organizations sharing
vendors, office space, and occasionally even a marriage bed. Heather K. Gerken, The Real Problem
with Citizens United: Campaign Finance, Dark Money, and Shadow Parties, the Boden Lecture, 97
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Politicians also do not control the timing of the expenditure. An
independent expenditure is typically an advertisement, which takes time
to create and place and typically is most effective if timed around an
election or vote on a particular issue. This is far different from a check
that can be handed over on the spot in response to a phone call timed
around a particular legislative or regulatory event.276 Without the direct
solicitation and immediate benefit to elected officials, the coercion
experienced by an unwilling donor is lessened to what courts may well
consider an acceptable level.277
This may be cold comfort to the strategic donor who acts out of an
awareness of structural rather than specific pressure. However, the
increased use of “shadow money” organizations that allow donors to
mask their identity suggests that such a donor also engages in a different
cost-benefit analysis when it comes to independent expenditures.278
Indeed, an independent expenditure that is subject to full disclosure may
be of limited value to the donor.279 Corporations, for example, face
“constraints, both legal and practical, that can easily dull their ardor to
engage in political campaigning,” from concerns regarding their
fiduciary duties to their shareholders to an interest in maintaining the
value of their brand.280 In addition, some have questioned the value of
independent expenditures to the candidates themselves; after all, it is the
donor, not the candidate, who controls the message.281 In short, the

MARQ. L. REV. 903, 916–17 (2014). Stephen Colbert underscored this point by conducting a
conference call with his campaign committee and the SuperPAC supporting him. Colbert Super
PAC - Not Coordinating with Stephen Colbert, THE DAILY SHOW (Jan. 17, 2012),
http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/3pwzi5/colbert-super-pac—-not-coordinating-with-stephencolbert; see also infra note 276. Although reality may belie the “independence” of such
expenditures, that is, for present purposes, a conceptually different problem.
276. But see supra notes 272, 275 (suggesting that a closer examination of the policy and practice
of independent expenditures is warranted).
277. This is not to say that the independent expenditure system does not pose its own problems of
rational coercion for donors. See Tucker, supra note 131; supra note 272.
278. See Mueller, supra note 99, at 113 (describing the rise and structure of “dark money”
organizations); Potter & Morgan, supra note 66, at 463 (providing history of rule that provides that
money funding independent expenditures need only be disclosed if it is explicitly given for use on a
particular ad).
279. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010) (upholding the disclosure
requirements of independent expenditures and electioneering communications in BCRA); Epstein,
supra note 172, at 656; see also Sarah Haan, The CEO and the Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Deregulation, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 269, 274–77 (2015) (describing consumer backlash to corporate
and executive political giving).
280. Epstein, supra note 172, at 656; see also Haan, supra note 279.
281. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365; FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 476 (2007);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976). This analysis may change if one considers the impact of
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likelihood that a genuinely independent expenditure is made unwillingly
and does not reflect the donor’s true intent is far less than attends a direct
political contribution.282
A similar distinction was noted in the wake of 1907’s Tillman Act.
Commentators observed that the Act quite deliberately banned only
direct contributions from corporations.283 Organizations that were
sincerely motivated to support a candidate, through either independent
expenditures or individual contributions channeled through managers in
the form of increased compensation (or, in later years, corporate PACs),
could still do so. Because these were more cumbersome means of
support, however, there was less risk that a donor would feel coerced
into giving. In the words of an observer at the time, the Act provided an
“excuse for the inability to respond swiftly and fully to an extortive
ultimatum” without dissuading true believers.284
The existence of the unwilling donor complicates the assumptions
undergirding current campaign finance doctrine and calls for a reexamination of the First Amendment interests it protects. At a minimum,
the unwilling donor suggests that the current “exacting scrutiny” test
should be re-configured to more accurately weigh both donors’ and the
government’s interests.285 As shown below, doing so would allow courts
to answer what now seem to be difficult questions of “fit” or linedrawing.
C.

Revisiting McCutcheon Through the Frame of the Unwilling
Donor

Moving on from general principles, this Article concludes by
considering how acknowledging the existence and interests of the
unwilling donor might have affected the Court’s analysis in
McCutcheon. Given that the result of the case disappointed many donors
negative advertisements.
282. There is, of course, still a question as to whether someone making independent expenditures
is doing so to participate in the electoral process or to improperly influence a legislator, but this is a
factual question that touches on the corruption justification, and for now the Court has answered it.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 324.
283. Sitkoff, supra note 31, at 1135–36.
284. Id. at 1125; see also id. at 1138 (quoting a 1906 New York Times article, which observed that
“[t]he [Act] will lessen a very mean and sordid practice of blackmail. The beneficiaries of
(regulation) will still find methods of furnishing the sinews of war to the party that controls their
favors, but the great number of corporations that have suffered extortion through weakness and
cowardice will have their backbones stiffened, and parties will be put to it to fill their coffers by
really voluntary contributions”).
285. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1437 (2014) (plurality opinion).
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who, in media interviews, sounded unexcited at the prospect of giving
beyond the previous aggregate limit,286 it is perhaps surprising that both
parties and most amici overlooked the problem of the unwilling donor.287
This omission reflects how deeply ingrained the narrative of the special
interest “rent-seeker” has become in campaign finance jurisprudence.
Had the unwilling donor been raised, it is uncertain whether his dilemma
would have changed the outcome of the case. It would, however, have
shaped the plurality’s analysis.
As an initial matter, an awareness of the unwilling donor would have
provided an answer to the two questions that were asked during oral
argument to which a plurality of the Court did not receive a satisfactory
response. Those questions, again, were: (1) Why should we draw a line
between the ninth candidate (who could receive $5200 in an election
cycle) and the tenth (who, because of the aggregate cap, could not), and
(2) How can the Government justify such tight limits on campaign
contributions when the same donors can spend an unlimited amount to
influence an election through independent expenditures?288
Viewing the case through the frame of the unwilling donor problem
enables one to propose answers to these questions. As to the question of
line drawing, once one understands campaign finance as a structural
reform that balances the First Amendment interests of two opposing
classes of donors, the need to draw a line is self-evident. For any donor
who wishes to give the full allowable amount to a tenth candidate, there
is likely to be one who wishes not to and yet feels that he cannot risk
saying no. As for where the line is drawn, as the Buckley Court noted,
“Congress’ failure to engage in . . . fine tuning does not invalidate the
legislation.”289
286. ASB Business Leaders Critical, supra note 21; see also Matea Gold & Tom Hamburger, In
2016 Campaign, the Lament of the Not Quite Rich Enough, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-2016-campaign-the-lament-of-the-not-quite-richenough/2015/03/24/f0a38b18-cdb4-11e4-8a46-b1dc9be5a8ff_story.html; Levitt, supra note 15
(“[H]ere’s a striking side effect: More than a few high rollers have not yet noticed that they just got
bumped outside the velvet rope.”).
287. See Levitt, supra note 113.
288. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451; McCutcheon Transcript, supra note 88, at 46–47. I have
rephrased them for the sake of clarity.
289. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976) (“As the Court of Appeals observed, ‘[i]f it is
satisfied that some limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say,
a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000.’” (citation omitted)). Under Buckley, of course, a
separate answer might have drawn the distinction between the rights of association and of
expression. Id. at 15, 22.The McCutcheon plurality was only able to invalidate the aggregate cap by
assuming that each extra dollar contributed adds to the “intensity” of the association or expression.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446–47; see also Rosen, supra note 99, at 1609–10 (considering and
rejecting arguments that might justify the McCutcheon plurality’s willingness to supplant legislative
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As to the contrast between campaign contributions and independent
expenditures, the discussion above outlines how contributions have long
been understood to carry with them greater coercive potential because of
the nexus between the solicitation and the contribution; the transactional
potential of the exchange is significant. In addition, the financial and
professional advantages of “hard money” contributions (e.g., fundraising
trips to exclusive resorts, party status earned by fundraising success,
cash on hand) inures far more directly to a candidate’s benefit than an
independent expenditure.290 The compulsion an unwilling donor may
feel to give is lessened in the case of a truly independent expenditure.
There is an additional point about independent expenditures that the
McCutcheon plurality overlooked; namely, that they provide an outlet
for the willing donor stymied by contribution caps, or an answer to the
question “But what is lost if we balance the interests?” It is curious that
the plurality did not engage this point. Although the plurality considered
(and rejected) an argument that in lieu of contributing a donor’s
associative interests could be met by volunteering to work for a
campaign,291 it overlooked the parallel argument regarding a donor’s
expressive interests—that any harm posed to a donor by an aggregate
cap was minimal because he could still express himself freely through
independent expenditures.292 Indeed, in other cases where litigants have
alleged interference with their First Amendment rights, the Court has
cited the fact that an alternative outlet existed to allow for the exercise of
the rights in rejecting the challenge. For example, in Regan v. Taxation
with Representation of Washington,293 the plaintiff challenged lobbying
restrictions for 501(c)(3) organizations, claiming they ran afoul of the
First Amendment’s protection of the right to petition the government. In
concurring with the Court’s opinion rejecting the challenge, Justice
Blackmun explained that because a charity can form a sister nonprofit as
a 501(c)(4) organization that can lobby without constraint (which in fact
many charities do), the restriction does not substantially burden First

judgments in this area).
290. See supra notes 127, 190.
291. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449 (“[P]ersonal volunteering is not a realistic alternative for
those who wish to support a wide variety of candidates or causes.”).
292. The McCutcheon plurality side-stepped this objection by defining the right at issue not as a
right to contribute to candidates one supports, but as a right to contribute up to the base limit to
every candidate one supports. Id. at 1449 (“To require one person to contribute at lower levels than
others because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on
broader participation in the democratic process.”); cf. Levitt, supra note 102.
293. 461 U.S. 540 (1997).
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Amendment rights.294
Had the unwilling donor’s interests been raised in McCutcheon, it is
also unlikely that the plurality could have so easily dismissed the
government’s concerns about the solicitation risks inherent in allowing
any federal candidate to request—and receive—millions of dollars from
a single donor.295 The plurality simply noted that presently “the
aggregate limits are not limited to any direct solicitation by an
officeholder or candidate,”296 without acknowledging that raising the
amount that could be solicited from a relatively modest $123,200 per
two-year cycle to a sum approaching $4 million (and subsequently raised
to $5.1 million) might well significantly alter the calculations that had
informed the existing system.297
Last, as discussed above, recognizing the unwilling donor would have
demonstrated to the plurality the limits of its analytical framework for
campaign finance cases. The unwilling donor faces pressures that are
unlikely to be addressed by individual anti-corruption laws, so it is not
enough to treat campaign finance as a prophylactic layer atop federal
criminal statutes.298 Moreover, his interests in not being compelled to
express and associate beyond his true beliefs are of a constitutional
dimension. At the very least, this would suggest a broader approach to
the tailoring question than the plurality applied.
In short, the problem of the unwilling donor may well have given the
McCutcheon plurality pause. At this point, however, the proverbial
horses have fled. Both Republicans and Democrats have launched joint
fundraising committees that can accept single checks in excess of the

294. Id. at 552–53. Of course, this case was decided without application of the exacting scrutiny
that is the hallmark of campaign finance cases. As this Article proposes that that scrutiny be
lessened, however, the analogy remains instructive. The majority’s reasoning in Taxation with
Representation is also relevant to the problem of the unwilling donor. The majority rejected the
plaintiff’s challenge on the grounds that to permit lobbying by a group with a double tax
advantage—501(c)(3) organizations are tax-exempt and donations to them can be deducted by the
donor—would be asking taxpayers to subsidize that activity. Id. at 549–50. The Court was thus
attentive to the existence of the unwilling donor qua taxpayer, albeit in a situation in which the
money paid is mandated rather than coerced.
295. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1453.
296. Id. at 1461.
297. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1485 app.B (describing how Justice Breyer came to the original
$3.6 million figure); Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and
Lobby Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 80 Fed. Reg. 5750 (Feb. 3 2015). If one includes PACs, the
number increases significantly. See supra note 15 (noting there are more than 7300 PACs, including
more than 500 Leadership PACs).
298. See supra note 206.
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previous aggregate limit.299 Five months after the decision in
McCutcheon was announced, The Washington Post reported that 310
donors had already given $11.6 million more than they could have
before the ruling.300 The article quoted one of these donors, who
indicated he had fielded “incessant political solicitations” since the
decision.301 “It used to be kind of nice to say, ‘I’m maxed out,’ but I
really believe that people running for office need to have support,” he
told the reporter.302
The dominant narrative is alive and well. It remains to be seen
whether any unwilling donors will emerge in future campaign finance
challenges to press their case.303 If they do, they may find wisdom in the
adage that politics makes strange bedfellows. History, it seems, has
come full circle, and once again the interests of the millionaires and
billionaires reluctant to make political contributions align with those of
299. Russ Choma, Super JFC Donors Emerge in Third Quarter, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 15,
2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/10/super-jfc-donors-emerge-in-third-quarter/.
300. Matea Gold, Wealthy Political Donors Seize on New Latitude to Give to Unlimited
Candidates, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/wealthypolitical-donors-seize-on-new-latitude-to-give-to-unlimited-candidates/2014/09/01/d94aeefa-2f8c11e4-bb9b-997ae96fad33_story.html; see also Julie Bykowicz, Annie Linskey & Greg Giroux,
Political Donors Hit Up for Cash Hours After Court Ruling, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 2, 2014, 9:00
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-03/political-donors-hit-up-for-cash-hoursafter-court-ruling.
301. Gold, supra note 300.
302. Id.
303. While beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that a court could take judicial
notice of the unwilling donor problem; indeed, this approach has been adopted by the Supreme
Court in recent campaign finance cases. In Citizens United, for example, the Court raised certain
questions sua sponte after the parties had already briefed the case, and although McCutcheon was
decided based on a limited record, both the plurality and dissent engaged in hypothetical donor
scenarios in their opinions, even going so far as to contemplate the problem of the willing, yet
corrupt donor. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1451 (2014) (plurality
opinion); Citizens United v. FEC, 580 U.S. 310, 396–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra
note 90 and accompanying text. It may be sufficient for the concern to be raised by an amici, as in
the Court’s 2015 decision in Williams-Yulee, which upheld a state bar rule prohibiting judicial
candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions. 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
Although the State’s brief focused on the risk of perceived judicial impartiality, some amici,
including the Conference of Chief Justices, dwelt on the possibility that an individual who might
appear before the judicial candidate in the future would feel coerced into making a contribution if
directly solicited. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Conference of Chief Justices in Support of
Respondents, Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (No. 13-1499). Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Roberts noted that “[t]his dynamic inevitably creates pressure for the recipient to comply.”
Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1660. Nevertheless, taking the concerns of the unwilling donor into
account after forty years of campaign finance jurisprudence ignoring him would be a substantial
paradigm shift, and it would require assumptions that some courts may be unwilling to make. In
order for a court to make a true assessment of the constitutional concerns in the balance, it would be
preferable for actual unwilling donors to intervene in existing actions.
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the campaign finance reformers who have long sought to limit their
ability to do so.
CONCLUSION
With the aggregate caps lifted and the amounts that can be solicited
on behalf of either party raised to $5.1 million for the 2015–2016
election cycle,304 the problem of the unwilling donor is likely to become
increasingly salient. Less certain is whether courts will take notice. Two
lawsuits pursued in 2014 following the McCutcheon ruling might have
been occasions for a court to consider—or an ambitious intervenor to
raise—the problem of the unwilling donor. One, Wagner v. FEC,305
challenged the ban on political contributions by federal contractors.306
The second, Republican National Committee v. FEC,307 proposed
allowing political parties to raise—and its officers and agents to solicit—
funds for independent expenditures.308 It appears, however, that any such
argument will have to wait. A unanimous en banc panel in Wagner
looked to existing doctrine to uphold the ban, and the parties agreed to
dismiss Republican National Committee v. FEC in late 2014.309 It may
not have to wait long, however. As this Article went to press, a petition
for certiorari was pending before the Supreme Court in Wagner.310 In
addition, a new challenge to the soft money ban was filed in August
2015, and some observers believe the case is likely to make it to the
Supreme Court.311
The goal of this Article has been to bring to light a problem that has
been too long overlooked in legal scholarship and to change the
304. See supra note 297.
305. 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
306. Id.
307. 698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2010).
308. Id.
309. See id.; Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2015) petition for cert. filed sub nom.
Miller v. FEC, No. 15-428, 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3550 (Oct. 2, 2014).
310. See Wagner, 793 F.3d at 21.
311. See Complaint, Republican Party of La. v. FEC, No. 15-cv-01241, 2015 WL 4965908
(D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2015); Richard L. Hasen, Op-Ed: The McCain-Feingold Act May Doom Itself,
NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202734808860/OpEd-TheMcCainFeingold-Act-May-Doom-Itself?slreturn=20151007011139 (“If the Republican Party of
Louisiana is able to convince the courts this time that the three-judge court is the appropriate route
to hear its soft-money challenge, then there’s a good chance the [Supreme Court] will . . . strike
down what remains of [the soft-money ban].”); Republican Party of La. v. FEC, No. 15-cv-01241,
2015 WL 7574753 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2015) (finding that plaintiffs have standing to present their
claims to a three-judge court).
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campaign finance narrative to better reflect the realities of the current
system and the constitutional issues at stake. Acknowledging the
unwilling donor helps resolve some persistent tensions in campaign
finance cases and suggests that courts should modify the existing
framework for reviewing campaign finance restrictions. Viewing
campaign finance interactions through the eyes of the unwilling donor
also complicates the Court’s current reliance on quid pro quo corruption
and demonstrates the need to maintain campaign finance limitations as
an intact system of structural reforms that cannot be replicated through
reliance on individual criminal prohibitions. It is likely that in the
coming election cycle new challenges to BCRA will provide
opportunities for an unwilling donor to join forces with campaign
finance advocates to advance together the interests of the few and the
many.312 Now that McCutcheon has raised the stakes, perhaps he will do
so.

312. See Donor Demographics, supra note 9 (noting that only 0.3% of the U.S. adult population
contributed more than $200 in the 2013–2014 election cycle, and only 0.05% contributed more than
$2600).

